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CRISIS IN RESPONSIBILITY:

EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROPHET EZEKIEL

A THESIS

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We, the undersigned, hereby certify that we have read and recommended to the General Faculty Council for acceptance, a thesis entitled CRISIS IN RESPONSIBILITY; EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROPHET EZEKIEL, submitted by Thomas Alan Parry, M.A., in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Divinity.

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DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

The present study is twofold in nature. First of all it is an attempt to present a legitimate basis for an under-standing of religious behavior. Secondly it will seek to apply such a method by an examination of the behavior of the biblical prophet Ezekiel, the subject of surely the most bizarre religious behavior described in the Bible. The overall purpose of this entire work is to restore Ezekiel's place as one of Israel's great prophets, and to show that he is a man, not mad, and therefore in our age of adjustment to be regarded with suspicion, but a man called to bear such a terrible message that its import prostrated him. To be in a position to do justice to Ezekiel's behavior, it will be necessary to establish the foundations for an adequate understanding of religious behavior.

CHAPTER 1

THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION BY CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY

Perhaps the least creative area in the field of psychology is the one that might well be expected to yield the most creative findings: the psychology of religious behavior. By religious behavior is meant the expression of man's relationship with what he conceives to be ultimate reality. More than sixty years after it was written, William James' Varieties of Religious Experience has not yet been superseded as the major work in the psychology of religion. The stature of James' classic is not due to the importance of its conculsions. Far from it. In spite of the inimitable manner in which James presented his subject matter and the helpful way that he categorized religious experiences, James made no attempt to formulate either a theory of religious behavior or to point to a theory of behavior conducive to the understanding of religious behavior. What he did do, apart from the useful distinctions that he suggested in types of religious experience, was to take such behavior seriously, no mean accomplishment in the midst of the scientism of his day. He had no intention however of passing judgment on its validity.

It would be unjust to criticize James for what he did not do. For the most part what he did not do he could not have done. Psychology was very much an infant science

when James wrote. He, in fact, was one of its founders. Almost simultaneously with Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig, James began experiments on human behavior in the 1870's at Harvard. (7). Thus, scarcely a quarter century had passed since psychology had attempted to become scientific in its procedures for understanding human beings. No coherent theories of human behavior had even been conceived by academic psychology when James wrote on religious behavior. Adequate methodology was still its major concern and rightly so.

The man who was soon to explode upon an unsuspecting world with a consistent and dynamic theory of human motivation and behavior, Sigmund Freud, had yet done little more than incite his Viennese medical colleagues to ridicule and ostracize him. His few books when not ignored were regarded as either occult or obscene. Freud had written The Interpretation of Dreams two years before James delivered his Gifford Lectures but this bible of psychoanalysis sold about 600 copies in its first ten years of publication. Freud does not rate even a foot note in Varieties of Religious Experience; in fact it is doubtful whether James had yet yeard of him. So the first comprehensive theory of human behavior had only just been born and was not available for James. James, therefore, could not have developed his religious experiences upon a theory of behavior. His only purpose was to speak a word for the integrity of religious conviction and the necessity for man to come to terms with the reality of his religious nature.

Though the psychology of religion got off to a

relatively good start it has never managed to realize its possibilities. Empirical psychology found the subject matter of religion to be difficult to experiment with and so tended to ignore the psychology of religious behavior. Psychoanalysis tended to dismiss religious behavior as a mass neurosis and so apparently never considered it except as a branch of social pathology. The psychology of religion established itself as a discipline in its own right with a considerable body of literature. However, its findings have never been integrated into the larger discipline of psychology. Thus it had tended to be regarded somewhat as a poor relation in the world of psychology, with little status.

The field of pastoral psychology has been very alert to derive various aspects of behavior having potential religious dimensions, anxiety and guilt for instance, especially from theories that are humanistic and social in their approach, such as those of Horney, Sullivan, Fromm and Rogers, as well as from Freud, Adler and Jung. Pastoral psychology has undeniably made a contribution to a sophisticated adaptation of psychology to man's spiritual needs, but except for Anton Boisen (5) it has neither provided a theory of man's behavior especially conducive to the understanding of religious phenomena nor has it operated consistently within the framework of a particular theory long enough to give itself any systematic foundation. The flow of traffic between pastoral psychology

and secular psychology has been almost entirely in one direction. Psychology has paid almost no attention to the role of the spiritual dimension in man. Thus pastoral psychology has had no opportunity to make any impact on the field of psychology in general.

Anton Boisen (5) alone among contemporary psychologists of religion has provided human behavior with a religious frame of reference in which certain human experiences fit. However Boisen seems almost exclusively to have restricted his theorizing to an understanding of catatonic schizophrenia. He was the first to point out that the great crisis that reduces the catatonic schizophrenia to immobility is the call of conscience for one to fulfill himself operating over against an overwhelming fear of venturing forth in decision. Boisen's very provocative theory was ignored by secular psychology and psychiatry and more strangely by the churches who so readily assented to his suggestions regarding their involvement in the area of mental health. Thus his concept of catatonic schizophrenia born of, and presumably therefore restricted to, his own experiences has been ignored for thirty years. Now it can be seen that he has anticipated the existential psychologists and psychiatrists as well as whatever of value there may be in Hobart Mowrer's position that pathology results from repression of the superego, not the id. (35)

Mowrer is the subject of much current discussion in the area of pastoral psychology. He has however received a mixed reaction. His view is within a Freudian frame of reference. It states that the neurotic symptom is not the result of a tyrannical superego repressing the impulses of the id so that these seek devious, maladaptive and anxious outlets. Instead the symptom is the result of the repression of the superego from which escape maladaptive, devious and anxious actions. Thus the solution for psychotherapy is to strengthen the superego so that unacceptable impulses are firmly rejected and prevented expression. An agent which facilitates the strengthening of the superego is the Church. It should be as capable as the psychotherapist in inculcating a sense of responsibility in the person to enable him to respond appropriately to reality. He feels that psychoanalysis has helped to destroy moral fiber and the sense of responsibility wherever it has spread its doctrines. This is because it excuses all personal problems as inevitable reactions to tyrannical authority in childhood. The neurotic actually has a moral problem, says Mowrer, and is not really a sick person. Many churchmen have been distressed by Mowrer's call for the church's return to an apparently judgmental and authoritarian role. They are also concerned with his dismissal of the importance of forgiveness. Personal atonement, he says, is what is required of the sinner not the palliative of forgiveness which encourages his wayward actions. Other

churchmen and pastoral psychologists have been impressed by what Mowrer has to say. They feel that his emphasis on personal responsibility is eminently desirable. How far they would go with him on his totally unchristian contempt for forgiveness none of these supporters are clear.

Undoubtedly Mowrer has made an important point. Personal responsibility has been given short shrift in the contemporary behavioral sciences; its absence has seemed to encourage an attitude of blandness in society-at-large and in the patient. However in stressing his position he has gone to an extreme. Some emotional problems may well be due to so-called repression of the superego. Surely it cannot be denied however that many are still the result of oppressive demands made in formative years which have constricted and inhibited development that maladaptive and anxious behavior is the inevitable result. Mowrer offers a corrective but not a valid position for the relationship between religion and psychology. Religious behavior thus seems to have made very little impact on modern psychology either as the psychology of religion, or as pastoral psychology. Let us examine some of the prevalent appraoches to psychology in terms of their understanding of the nature of man, how he is to be studied, and the ole ascribed by them to religion among man's activities. Such a survey may enable us to discover why religious behavior receives such inadequate treatment in modern attempts to understand man.

Carl Jung (26) has made some vital contributions,

not only to our understanding of man's need for a religious center to his personality, but for the light he sheds on behavior all too often associated with Christianity. From a Christian point of view however, Jung remains suspect because of the conception of God in his approach. The Godarchtype is the numinous inner experience of grasping power and holiness which integrates man's being. This experience is an accumulation of mankind's repeated experiences with such power. This says nothing of its independent reality. In fairness to Jung it is neither his intention nor his responsibility to provide proofs of God's existence.

The symbol of Jesus Christ is also important for Jung. He is for western man the preeminent symbol of the Self. However his historical reality is of no importance whatever to Jung. Jung's approach therefore seems to assume gnostic qualities, which he freely admits. He is even more open to criticism in his concept of the collective unconscious. This idea has not found any kind of general acceptance outside his own circle in the world of psychology. Evidence outside Jung's circle for the collective unconscious seems totally absent. Thus, however compelling, Jung's views are and however encouraging they may seem to some religious thinkers, if there is no substantial evidence for their truth, except that provided by Jungians, his theories must be held in abeyance at least until more compelling evidence is forthcoming.

Freud's understanding of man is starkly pessimistic (15). Man is locked within himself, all his activities serve only his biological needs. He is incapable of concerning himself with anything but the quiescence of all stimulation, so that death, the ultimate quiescence is the sole goal of life. This is more Buddhist in its ontology that Christian and more Oriental in its world view than Occidental. Its denial of the possibility that activities in the world have any intrinsic value other than to still sensory irritation places psychoanalysis in marked contradiction to the Christian understanding of man's nature and destiny. Christianity states that man in his fallen state is inescapably bound up in himself and seeks only to serve his own needs. It also asserts however that Divine grace frees him from exclusive self-service for services in the world; so paradoxically he remains simul justus et peccator. In the Freudian system the genital stage of development is supposed to set man free for object -love. However in terms of libido theory this is not possible because libido only serves the organism's need for the cessation of irritation.

Students of mankind can only be grateful to Freud for the way in which he cleared his way past the obvious in man to the depths of his actual emotions and motivation. Unfortunately, however, due in part to the times in which he lived and to his own medical and scientific training, he framed his theories to make of men a kind of biomechanistic energy system. In doing so he may have done as much to

obstruct a profound understanding of the nature of man as he did to reveal what was hitherto hidden about man. His skepticism about all overt behavior led him to doubt the validity of all outward appearances. All behavior is self -concealing. Thus all love becomes disguised hate, all cleanliness becomes disguised dirtiness, all independence disguised dependence. At first this insight gave the most profound understanding of man's motivations since Jesus penetrated the hypocrisy of self-righteous behavior. However it became a dogma for psychoanalysis and came to be as much a hindrance as an insight.

Freud shows us that the great areas of man's difficulties with himself and with society are in the expression of sexuality and aggression, or better still love and hate, life and death. Thus Freud is more even than a scientist of the psyche, he is a metaphysician of the soul. He is a dialectician, for psychoanalysis is not merely a science but a rediscovery of the dialetical nature of man. Brown's brilliant work Life Against Death points this out with great effectiveness. At the same time as Freud rediscovered the dialectic process at work in man he effectively reunited body and soul for the first time in western thought since Biblical times. For Freud sexuality is the pysiological correlate of love and life while aggression is the correlate of hate and death.

On the verge of such a profound understanding of the nature of man Freud is led astray by the bio-mechanistic

reductionism of the libido theory so that man is reduced to an energy system. Freud seems to have fallen into reductionism as a result of one of his most significant discoveries, namely that appearances may be a reversal of the actual. Psychoanalysis makes this revelation into a technique in which every behavior automatically signifies its opposite. It is then a short step to the position that the explanation of behavior need not bear any relation to the behavior that it explains. Thus dialectic in man becomes obscurantist and psychoanalysis is free to disregard the spirit of a person's behavior. Instead it mechanically attributes all outward appearances to their opposite motivating emotion.

Freud's discoveries it would seem can only retain their value and their accuracy as long as they do justice to the ambiguity of the human subject matter. Irreparable damage is done when the model becomes merely a system of energy.

Much of what Freud says is of inestimable value in the understanding of religious behavior. The heart of Freud's system should remind us of man's almost limitless capacity for self-deception. Freud also as already noted, reunites body and soul, a notion implicit in the Biblical understanding of man. Thus to be at peace with oneself is to be at peace with body and its needs. Through the intrusion of Greek thought in the early centuries of the Christian era, Christianity seems to have been led away from the Biblical tradition concerning the goodness of God's creation, into a wholly unbiblical revolt against the evils and limitations of the body.

More than anyone, except perhaps Lutgher, Freud has enabled Christianity to rediscover its unascetic Biblical heritage. According to the Freudian scheme, if man fearfully repudiates bodily needs then all parts of himself are truncated for integral to man's spiritual growth is total self-acceptance. Man is therefore called to be completely honest with himself and open to himself. Brown (11) goes even further than Freud in insisting that repression is the realm of death; only when man abolishes or overcomes repression says Brown, accepting every manifestation of himself will death be defeated. The fear of death he says is the fear of unlived potentialities.

The most important lesson to be learned from Brown is that in such hands psychoanalysis is able to overcome the limitations imposed on it by deterministic reductionism. We are in inestimable debt to the genius and uncompromising honesty of Freud but only when his discoveries are understood at the human level will they fully blossom as an aid to human understanding.

When Freud deals with religion explicitly (14) he is seriously inadequate however. He appears only to have observed neurotic religious behavior in any quantity and he seems to be totally unaware of the existence of mature religion, in spite of his long friendship with his colleague Rev. Oskar Pfister. It is not surprising therefore, that Freud would regard religious behavior in terms of immaturity, dependency and superstitious fear, for it is precisely these terms which define the neurotic personality to which Freud was almost

exclusively exposed in his practice. It would be surprising if the neurotic person's attitude to religion was any different from his approach to life in general.

Most of Freud's attack on religion as it appears in Future of an Illusion is taken seriously only because of the repudiation of the author. Apart from his reputation, Freud's views on religion are on a level with a common village atheist and about as poorly thought out. To begin with almost all Freud's examples of religious behavior are taken from the primitive, the infantile and the pathological, in other words, the levels where man's thought is most restricted. Thus his sampling methods are inexcusable from a scientific point of view. Furthermore as has often been pointed out: to say that one believes because of excessive dependency upon the father -figure of childhood is on the same level of validity as to say that one disbelieves because of rebellion against an inadequate father. They cancel each other.

In conclusion it may be said that while there is great value in much of what Freud has discovered for the understanding of religious behavior the mechanistic reductionism by which he has chosen to conceptualize his discoveries gives an unacceptable picture of the nature of man upon which to formulate a psychology of religion.

The contribution that experimental psychology makes to the understanding of religious behavior is negligible. As has been noted above, O.H. Mowrer a noted learning theorist has written on the subject but he was forced to use the

conceptualizations of psychoanalysis to do so. Even if he had tried he probably would have found the reductionism of learning theory inadequate for the subject matter. Since by and large experimental psychology refuses to admit any important discontinuity between man and animal it cannot attribute much importance to any religious impulse on man's part, except perhaps as a secondary reinforcement based upon stimulus generalization. The sign-gestalt approach to Tolman (21) might hold room for the interpretation of religious behavior but would have to reduce it to terms that would leave it with no intrinsic reality of its own.

Thus a survey of some major approaches to psychology demonstrates the inadequate treatment that religious behavior has received. It has neither been given, nor have its exponents given it, a satisfactory theoretical foundation. Depth psychology sheds a great deal of light on various aspects of religious behavior. In fact it serves a definite religious purpose in revealing the extent of self-deception to which all flesh is heir. Thus the quarrel that the psychology of religion has with most approaches to psychology in seeking a satisfactory theoretical basis lies <u>in the area of methodology rather than with their discoveries.</u> The problem with classical psychoanalysis specifically would appear to be with the bio-mechanistic reductionism of the libido concept.

Quite apart from religious phenomena modern psychology seems to be reaching a crisis in its very nature as a science. It has become less and less a human science both in its subject

matter and in the level of its interpretation of behavior. So enamored has psychology been with the methodology of the physical sciences, accepting theirs as the sine qua non of the scientific method, that it has sought at whatever cost to restrict its study of behavior to that discoverable by such methods. Thus all human behavior that is not adaptable to this method, as far as most impirical psychology is concerned tends to be minimized.

Classical psychoanalysis, too, has taken for its methodological model the physcial sciences. Psychoanalysis begins with a brilliant series of discoveries about the nature of man, and of course remains exclusively concerned with human behavior. However following the physical sciences it assumes that complete determinism defines man's behavior in the same manner as an animal is driven by its needs and fears, or that an electrical system inviolably follows certain laws. Added to this, psychoanalysis explains all behavior in terms of often unverifiable unconscious motivation based upon a rigid application of the laws that it has discovered. Thus the behavior that is explained need bear no resemblance to what is outwardly presented. This is why it is called "depth" psychology. By turning its dialectical understanding of man's self-deception into terms appropriate only for the physical sciences psychoanalysis not only looses its genius but becomes mere obscurantism. It can either retain the dialectical understanding or else use the methods of a physical science but not both, and in choosing

the latter, as it apparently has, it ceases to be a human science. It needs a method commensurate with its subject matter: human beings.

Thus the problem facing both experimental psychology and psychoanalysis is actually inadequate methodology for understanding what is peculiar to human behavior. Their inability to provide a theoretical basis for religious behavior is merely an inevitable outcome of using an approach which reduces what is most peculiarly human to more manipulable terms. The problem that the present study is faced with goes beyond just establishing a psychology of religion. It must answer the question of whether there can be adequate methodology for a human science. A human science would have to be able to cope with all manifestations of human behavior no matter how intangible they may appear without resorting to the temptation to reduce them to more tangible terms. If, therefore, religious behavior is a legitimate aspect of human behavior then it must be dealt with on its own terms, and not reduced to an infantile problem or a form of secondary reinforcement.

The epistemology of all modern science begins with the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy. The object of knowledge is 'out there.' There is no concern with the subject of the study. This repudiation of subjectivity is an outgrowth of the beginnings of modern science when the knower was required to bring all sorts of dogmatic presuppositions to his quest for knowledge and to regard the object in the light of his presuppositions, and prejudicies. When modern science was

able to free itself from the heteronomous demands of the Church that saw the world in the light of its own requirements science not unnaturally reacted sharply against the limitations under which it had been required to operate. Cartesian philosophy provided the perfect method for an unimpeded quest for knowledge. A dichotomy was conceived in the philosophy of Descartes, for he sought to come to the quest for knowledge with no assumptions whatever. In concerning himself with such a possibility Descartes had to assume that there was a radical separation between the subject of knowledge, i.e., the knower, and the object of knowledge, i.e., the known. Descartes was a mathematician. Consequently it would be a relatively easy matter for him to disregard the subjective element and simply regard the universe in its self-sufficient essence. The great philosophers of the seventeenth century such as Leibnitz and Spinoza were mathematicians and also readily accepted this approach to knowledge. Locke's tabula rasa upon which the objective world is implanted is also symptomatic of this approach. It was no accident that subjectivity was repudiated in favor of objective knowledge which all men could agree upon, where there was no personal involvement.

The new method was ideally suited for the physical and later the natural sciences. In order for the truth of the universe to speak to men they had only to let it speak out of its independent reality. There were no connections between the personal knower and the impersonal known except man's reational faculty and the law-abiding state of reality. Western man by and large was totally unaware of any deficiency

in this approach to knowledge. He did not need to be in his study of the physical and natural sciences, as has been noted. Of course in the realms of personal relationships, in politics, statecraft and the arts what the subject brought to the situation remained a very important factor in the success of any endeavor. A balance between subjectivity and objectivity remained inevitable and necessary. A purely objective approach would be cold and indifferent to human feelings and needs. An entirely subjective approach would be ruinous for it would allow feelings and needs to be imposed upon reality. Only as the subject was seen as a creative force in relationship with objective reality, in other words only as the subject-object dichotomy was realized to be a false one and overcome could truth in human relationships be achieved.

Pascal saw this problem and retained a distinction between the intuitive and the mathematical mind, the latter valuable for the treatment of clear and distinct ideas, and the former for the understanding of the ambiguities of the human situation. Kierkegaard in the nineteenth century reacted against the pan-rationalism of Hegel and stressed that truth is not found in abstract theory but in personal existence and committment. "Truth exists," his well-known words echo, "only as the individual produces it in action." Kierkegaard was not really heard until the twentieth century. However, Schopenhauer, Dilthey and especially Nietschze attacked rationalism, which, on one hand, made man into a subject, having reality only as a thinking being, or else as an object

to be calculated and controlled like other objects in the physical and natural universe.

The budding science of psychology, which first came into existence in Wilhelm Wundt's laboratories at Leigzig in the 1870's, should have taken note of what this line of thinkers were saying, for they were speaking about man with incisive insight. However apparently those were not times for any would -be science to appear tainted with the brush of philosophy. Scientific psychology had a hard enough time freeing itself from the embrace of philosophy into whose arms it was thrust by the academic world. 'Mental philosophy' they were wont to call it. Psychology however aspired to be a science and the model sciences were deemed to be physics, chemistry, and biology. This being the case, their methodology must be the standard by which a science would be judged. The Webster's Dictionary definition of what constitutes a science is very cogent: "a science is a systematized body of knowledge which is gathered from observation, study and experimentation, and which seeks to determine the nature of principles of what is being studied." The scientific method is a method used to obtain information that could be duplicated and therefore be verified by another disinterested scientist. However this method must be adapted to the limitations implicit in the particular field of study. Psychology adopted the methodology and the epistemology of the physical and natural sciences, and therefore assumed implicitly the subject-object dichotomy.

Man would be regarded as an object of study like all other objects of study. Psychology seemed to think that man could be abstracted out of his world and manipulated to discover the laws by which he behaved. However man is so inextricably involved in his world that he cannot be studied apart from it. A method suitable to study man must study him in his world. Thus man as subject and the world as object cannot simply be made into a dichotomy from which man can be abstracted and made into an object of study. A method must be adapted to the uniqueness of the subject matter. Man cannot be understood simply as a complex reflex mechanism, as stimulus-response theory maintains. He does not merely respond to the world. He intereacts with his world. He brings himself to each situation as a participant.

Is there an escape from the limitations imposed upon the study of human behavior by the methodology of the major trends in modern psychology? Does an approach exist which takes into account the capacity of man to rise above the simple contingencies of the world to some degree and to seek and invest meaning in his world? Is their a method which accepts a certain distinctiveness in man? Is there one that is not compelled to reduce statements about man first to natural then to physical terms, but regards his behavior in terms of what he presents? Happily the answer to the high expectations implicit in these questions seems to be yes, thanks to the impact finally being felt in America of the various existential

phenomenological approaches to psychology that have long influenced European psychology. These approaches have long been quite out of temper with the empirical positivistic inclinations of Anglo-Saxon psychology. Such men as Gordon Allport, A. Angyal, and A.H. Maslowe, and in the more applied area, Carl Rogers have been lone voices stressing human uniqueness, individual integrity and distinctiveness, the importance of values in reckoning with humans, the holistic and phenomenological approach. In recent years to their voices have been added: the Daseinsanalysis or existential analysis of Rollo May, and translations of works by Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, Ervin Strauss, Eugene Minkowski and other of similar approach and sympathy. This is not a new theory of human behavior, there are enough of those; it is rather, a different approach which begins with different assumptions about man. With these assumptions in hand it realizes that appropriate methods must be applied.

It is in this approach that new possibilities may be found for an understanding of religious behavior for in this approach all that man discloses in his uniqueness as a being in the world is taken seriously. To that approach we now turn.

CHAPTER II

DASEINSANALYSIS:

THE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

Martin Heidegger is known to the world as an existentialist. He himself disclaims that label, probably due to the connotations of bohemian nihilism which cling to the term on account of the excesses and sensationalism surrounding the existentialism of the Paris Left Bank followers of Jean Paul Sartre. Heidegger would probably prefer to be called if anything, an ontologist. He has sought to construct an ontology, upon the wreckage of Western metaphysics, founded not as previously on cosmology where it was demolished by Kant, but instead on the analysis of man. Though Heidegger seeks to analyze being through man, he never refers to man as such; he is always Dasein (being there). Man is Dasein because he is inextricably the being who is there, in the world. He cannot be divorced from the world in which he finds himself. The world makes him and he makes it. From the beginning of such an analysis therefore it is established that if man is to be studied it must necessarily be in his context, in the world. He cannot be abstracted, or separated out from the world to be manipulated or observed. This approach of Heidegger is very useful for a change of methodology in psychology which following the natural and physical sciences has viewed the study of man almost exclusively in terms of manipulation and abstracted observation. Following Heidegger's phenomenological

approach such artificiality is impossible because man is Dasein, in the world. He is studied as he is where he is.

Heidegger distinguished between things, which are utilizable or else simply present, and they can be studied and known as such. Man or Dasein can only be known as an individual subject. The most important feature of the latter is that Dasein is personally concerned for his own existence, and he can only come to terms with what he is by coming to terms with his possibilities. The decision that he makes regarding his possibilities determines whether he gains or loses his true self, or authentic being.

It had best be made clear what is meant by 'being.' It is a difficult concept in English, though far less so in other languages. As a noun being refers to anything that 'is,' therefore, any object at all, a table, a stone, a tree. Being is also used as a verb signifying "to-be" or perhaps more aptly in English "to-become." Heidegger himself has suggested that the difficulties presented by English be resolved by differentiating between <u>beings</u> as things that are, and Being, referring to the 'to-be' or 'to-become' of whatever is. Heidegger further contends that Western thought has from its beginnings been bound to things, to objects. Thus when Being is thought of only in terms of beings and objects it becomes the most abstract and empty of concepts. It is not a subject of concern, it is what is most taken for granted. However Heidegger sees Being as the most real and concrete concern of everyone.

Heidegger's teacher Edmund Husserl conceived of phenomenology in the first place as a return to the things themselves, instead of the theoretical conceptions we have put in their place. Heidegger however has a mania for the origin of words as the basis for a true understanding of what it is about reality that a given word was meant to disclose. The word phenomenon comes from the Greek verb 'phainesthai' -to show, to shine. Phenomenology therefore means for Heidegger the attempt to let the thing show itself, or shine forth into the world. It will disclose itself only if it is not coerced into a ready made conceptual strait-jacket. We do not know things says Heidegger by reducing them but by letting things be what they are, letting them shine forth unimpeded. Shining forth is a very apt description, for phainesthai is connected with the word phaos, light, and apophansis, statement or speech. Thus the sequence is revelation - light - language. Reality is revelation in other words. Going even further according to what may seem to us mere clever word-play at worst or metaphoric language at best, but what was the heart of reality in the dawn of the Greek language, Heidegger sees in the very word truth a further key to renewed understanding. The Greek word for truth aletheia means literally un-hiddeness, revelation what is disclosed. Truth emerges from hiding. Truth is not what the intellect derives from phenomena but what discloses itself as real.

Man is a being who resides in a certain relation to

truth. What he decides about what truth is is what he becomes, how he discloses himself. Man is Being-in-the-world. By the fact of his existence he is involved totally and inextricably in the world. The very word existence means to stand outside oneself, to go beyond oneself. Thus one's Being is directed toward the field of its care and concern. Heidegger's, thus, is a field theory of man, not dissimilar in many ways to that of Kurt Lewin (21). Man says Barrett (3) is a field or region of Being. This field of Being is Dasein (Being-there) and is distinguished from even the concept man which has come to imply man in abstraction, an object or entity separate from the world. Heidegger also speaks of man without using the term consciousness which keeps us in a dualism regarding man.

Unless Dasein <u>becomes</u>, in other words discloses the Being for which he is responsible, then he does not exist (ek-sist - standout) authentically. He drifts in an impersonal realm as an object, subject to the pressures of the world about him. In such a state he is <u>fallen</u>. In such living he is spared the anxiety and the dignity of becoming a Self. It is assuredly more comfortable to live in the conventional, impersonal realm of the "they" rather than to face the anxiety implicit in growth, or becoming a disclosed Self. The tendency therefore is to surrender to the "they" and fall into inauthenticity.

Regardless of what level, the authentic disclosing level, or the inauthentic, evasive level, human existence is marked by three features called existentialia: (1) mood or feeling; (2) understanding; (3) speech. These categories identify Dasein's entire relationship toward his field.

(1) Mood is not a feeling we have, something to be adopted or dropped at will. Dasein does not have a mood, he is his mood. It means that in a given mood, such as joy, sadness, dread, Dasein is this toward his world. It is also the spirit in which Dasein acts. No matter how forceful the mood or spirit is it is the mode in which Dasein relates to, sees, and discloses itself to the world. The fundamental mood that pervades all other moods at all times is anxiety. This is because existence as a possession is intrinsically precarious and contingent.

(2) Understanding is not theoretical; it is the understandin; of Being which determines how we live with Being and toward Being. It is the presupposition by which we evaluate the world that presents itself to us. It establishes the conditions and circumstance upon which we open ourselves to the world. If we understand the world to be fundamentally a frightful place then we will restrict our openness to the world accordingly. However if the world appears to accept us then we will tend to disclose ourselves, the Being for which we are responsible, more fully. Most of the time we do not question how we receive or understand the world, we just respond slavishly according to an implicit understanding. The the extent that we do understand our understanding we become free to disclose ourselves more openly.

(3) Speech does not consist of words, or phrases only. We only speak truly of the world as we cast aside our preconceptions and let ourselves see things as they are. As we respond to reality as it is, as it presents itself, as we

encompass in words, or even if desirable without words, we speak truly of and with Being. Speech is the fundamental attunement or address of one existent to another, from which all language proceeds. Unless, in his speech he is expressing the free disclosure of Being then he is merely chattering. Most use of words is not revelatory and thus is chatter, because it is forced and evasive. Being is disclosed through language, language does not control Being.

The primary fact which defines all existence is death. To be truly able to understand significance of death is to be able to accept that "I will die." All refusal to accept this existentially is an evasion of life because life and death cannot really be separated. As soon as I accept my death as a reality coming to me then and only then does authentic existence become a possibility for me. As unwanted as death may be, only acceptance of it frees us from the fears that engulf and forbid openness to all that the world presents. If we fear or deny death then our existence is circumscribed by barriers erected by our fears. We cannot be truly open to a world in which everything that presents itself may be hiding the death that we either fear or refuse to acknowledge. In the face of a death that is feared or evaded we are not free but determined by what we fear.

Because of our finitude we cannot avoid death unless we choose to live an illusory, trivial existence and even this witnesses to a fear of coming to terms with life's realities. Our finitude means that Being and non-Being exist in mutual

penetration. Thus we can never escape from the reminder of non-Being or death. All anxiety is derived from the fear of non-Being or death. Yet anxiety is not fear, which is of definite objects, it is the uncanny feeling of being afraid of nothing, literally no-thing. Anxiety, then, the uncanny dread in the face of the abyss is our existence in its radical insecurity. It is the feeling that at the very center of our existence we are threatened.

Because we know that we are going to die we are aware of time. Our time is limited. Without the realization of our mortality time has no meaning. Time is therefore intrinsic to our existence. Everything is seen in terms of the no-longer, the here-and-now, and the not-yet. We relate ourselves to reality in terms of these tenses of time. The future is primary to Heidegger because it is toward the future that man projects and defines his own being. Man looks toward the future that he projects and defines his own being. Man looks toward the future carrying with him, the burden of his past by which he orients himself to the present and the future. Man is thus an historical being because he defines himself and his activities in terms of what specifically happened, however vaguely he may understand it, in his past. It is what has limited him in his past, what has threatened him that, as he fears or evades death, decides what he tends to fear and avoid now and in the future. Those events which have become equated with the dread of no-thingness are now allowed to disclose themselves to our openness. We no longer

allow ourselves to be made aware of them. They are partners of death or no-thingness and suffer the same fate as death, i.e., avoidance, rejection, repression. Thus our awareness is how much of the world in which we are free from the anxiety of no-thingness. Those terrifying events which threaten us or remind us of our finitude are no longer open to us, or rather we are not open to them. Psychoanalysis reopens them to us by showing us that these events do not threaten us at our center as we had assumed. Thus we can be open to them. When death is accepted as our destiny we can be open to all that presents itself and can live authentically. Being can disclose itself through us fully and freely and we become what is our responsibility to become, that is "shepherds of Being." That is our destiny, our responsibility and our opportunity.

The fall of Being occurs, says Heidegger when man ceased to accept himself as continuous with his field. Instead, to protect himself, man detached things from out of the field, as clear and distinct so that he could reckon with them, master them, overpower them. Truth therefore came to reside in the human intellect which abstracted discrete objects from the world. The object becomes manipulable, calculable, remote from man. The subject therefore becomes conscious of himself as separate from the world of objects, the more so as he learns to manipulate and overpower them. The very word object from the Latin <u>ob-jectum</u> means that which is put or thrown before,

therefore something to be mastered. Man therefore has come to the point where he masters beings, but not Being. He loses himself in the world of beings but never Being. He loses himself in the world of beings, possessions, utilities. As man becomes accustomed to encountering the world in terms of beings but never Being, he encounters all beings as objects of control and manipulation, including one another, and finally being treated as an object all the time he regards himself as an object, the primary object of his own care.

Man's only salvation lies in the return to Being. He must learn to let Being be instead of detaching it, and seeking to overpower it. When it is said "Let Being be" it means that we wait upon Being to manifest itself, to disclose itself, in ourselves and in our world. We are not called to master the world but to acknowledge and accept what reveals itself. This is a counsel of passivity or better still of faith in Being. It bears striking similarities to Oriental thought particularly as it is found in Taoism and Zen Buddhism. If it were only to better understand this counsel is what Christianity means by justification by faith with the important distinction that in Christianity Being is personal and loving and therefore has content that invites us to rely fully on the revelation of Being.

Though Heidegger disclaims similarity, what he calls Being resembles in many ways what the Christian means by God: what is indefinable, that which irreducibly is, "I am."

We receive Being by thinking on it. But "think" and "thank" are kindred words, a helpful fact long-forgotten.

We best think on Being by waiting in gratitude, thankful, that we are privileged to be bearers of Being. Our existence is rooted in Being and so we give thanks, accepting the unwarranted gift for the time it is given, open to its revelation of itself. We let ourselves live as Being directs us, according to its disclosures not 'out there' or 'in here,' for there is only Dasein. Being calls us, impels us, pushes itself on man because man is pre-eminently responsible for his Beingness. Because Dasein lives in fear, in the influence of the "they" he cannot take hold of the possibilities of Being. Thus"Dasein makes no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity" (18, p. 312). Heidegger goes on "because Dasein is lost in the "they," it must first find itself. In order to find itself at all, it must be 'shown' to itself in its possible authenticity." (18, p. 313). Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-itself is attested for us by the experience of the "voice of conscience." Conscience reveals itself as a <u>call</u>. "The call of conscience has the character of an <u>appeal</u> to Dasein by calling it to its own most potentiality-for-Being-itself; and this is done," says Heidegger, "by way of summoning it to its own most Being-guilty" (18, p. 314).

The call of conscience does not refer to a "still small voice" or a homunculus of any kind. It has, rather, "the momentum of a push - of an abrupt arousal" (18, p. 316). "It reaches him who wants to be called back" (18, p. 316). It is the self that is addressed by the call of conscience

to open itself to its potentiality for becoming, for disclosing Being, for letting Being be. It is the call to forsake the fretful fraudulence of the restrictions imposed by conventionality. The self is not called to dwell on itself it is called to Being-in-the-world. It calls Dasein forth and forward to its own possibilities. The call of conscience is against our expectation and even our will. "The call comes from me and yet from beyond me" (18, p. 320).

In calling to the possibilities of becoming an authentic self Dasein's Being-in-the-world is brought face to face with the nothing of the unknown future. To face one's potentiality for being one is made anxious, because it is the safety of conventionality that makes things predictable, and manipulable. In letting one's hitherto unexpressed possibilities come into the light of expression, untested, one is confronted in Kierkegaard's phrase, with the "dizziness of freedom." The call is unfamiliar with everyday conventional self and urges one like an alien voice beyond it. One is called to be the most difficult thing in the world: an individual, unsupported except by the revelation of Being. Conscience then is the authentic pressure of Being to manifest itself and the call of the self to responsibility for the Beingness in its care. The fact that conscience calls indicates that we are guilty. We are not disclosing the fullness of the Being within our care, thus it has to press for disclosure. This sense of 'being-guilty' is a sense of indebtedness to Being for one's Beingness. It recalls us to our nature as responsible. We are responsible not only for not letting Being express its

fullness through us, but for the lack of something in the Dasein or existence of the other, the 'thou'. As a being we are responsible for all Beingness to fulfill the Beingness in our care that it may draw forth the inhibited Being of another. "Dasein" says Heidegger, "is altogether incommensurable with anything present-at-hand or generally accepted which is not it itself, or which is not <u>in the way Dasein is</u> - namely, existing" (18, p. 329).

Dasein projects itself on all possibilities into which it has been thrown. It is responsible, in other words, for all that comes within its field, but Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities, and thus is guilty. When Dasein makes its own basis, or <u>raison d'etre</u> it forsakes its possibility and responsibility to project itself into the world within its compass. Conscience calls Dasein back from its constricted possibilities in the conventional world to fulfill itself as Being-in-the-world. The very call of conscience to unrealized possibilities always signifies guilt. Dasein however need not search for guilt through its failures or ommissions, it must only be guilty authentically; accept responsibility for what is within reach of its potentialities. It must in other words open itself to the expression of the possibilities of its Being-in-the-world. It must take care of what is thrust up before it according to its need.

As long as conscience is only attended to in the conventional world by its standards to know only "the satisfying of manipulable rules and public norms and the failure to satisfy

them. It reckons up the infractions of them and tries to balance them off. It has slunk away from its own most Being-guilty so as to be able to talk more loudly about making 'mistakes.' (18, p. 334)

This is the everyday conscience which one appeases while remaining in the conventional realm. Only he hears the call of conscience who is ready to be appealed to. "In understanding the call, Dasein lets its ownmost Self take action in itself in terms of that potentiality-for-Being which it has chosen" (18, p.334). Wanting to have a conscience however becomes a readiness for anxiety, for one relies only on the direction toward which one's responsibility leads one. One in effect loses control of oneself and obeys the call of possibility in radical openness to the world which one encounters and the truth which it seeks so disclose. 'Concernful solicitude' becomes the manner in which one directs one's activity. One is responsible for one's Beingness and for the disclosure of all Beingness within the range of one's concern, free from the attention to oneself which marks the inauthentic existence fearfully evading death. The call to fulfill one's possibilities does not mean however that one is driven blindly at the whim of impulse. "When the call of conscience summons us to our potentiality-for-Being it does not hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but calls us forth into the Situation." (18, p. 347). One goes into each situation with resolution to act according to its needs.

What has all this to do with psychology? Let two things be made clear fist of all. It is not a new theory of behavior, and it is not a return to armchair psychology. It is an approach to psychology that can serve many theories, thus. It presents an overall hypothesis or as Strasser says a "vision," a frame of reference by which to attempt to understand behavior. Daseinanalysis merely requests that man be understood in terms of very real features of his nature which differentiate him from all other beings. Man alone knows that he is subject to death and this knowledge colors his behavior in a way that is quite dissimilar to an avoidance of pain reaction by an animal, say a rat on a grill. Man fundamentally lives in the mode of care, as Heidegger says, and this mode limits his freedom toward the world. The animal knows only of pain, and its possibility is free from care when not confronted with these.

As a consequence of man's confrontation with nothingness he reflects on himself in care for himself. It is out of this reflection that his capacity to evaluate himself and to act in the light of that evaluation results. He is faced with the decision of whether to be dominated by death, for all fear and all anxiety is rooted in the fear of death. Life would thus be determined by the contingencies of the world. He can also live openly, freely, courageously, to fulfill his possibilities and thus to live in a measure of freedom or self-transcendence. No man lives wholly at

either extreme. Men do stand out of themselves when higher values are presented, yet no man can will away the fear of death and thus all men are restricted, inhibited, repressed by what terrifies them.

Daseinsanalysis calls for a simple acceptance of these realities in attempting to understand human behavior. It thus calls behavioral scientists to accept man as man and to understand him in terms of his unique understanding of himself and the extent to which that understanding affects his behavior. Thus Daseinsanalysis is a phenomenological science. It finds it neither necessary nor desirable to reduce human behavior to simpler levels, except where it is clearly seen that we are dealing with clear continuities of behavior. When man's distinctive Being-in-the-world is the subject of consideration it seeks understanding purely at that level.

Daseinsanalysis also seeks to recall the behavioral sciences from the artificialities of the subject-object dichotomy to a field approach to human behavior which overcomes this dichotomy. It of course is not the first to make such an effort. This is implicit in all forms of gestalt psychology, in Levin's field theory of behavior, and in the interpersonal theory of Harry Stack Sullivan. Such a field approach, though not new, would seem to lend itself to many approaches to behavioral understanding that still treat organisms as discrete objects to be abstracted, then manipulated according to a theoretical mould. Classical psychoanalysis is certainly

guilty of this appraoch. It is the presupposition of all Freud's work that the individual and the demands of society are irrevocably antagonistic. The clearest formulation of this view is found in Civilization and its Discontents. Such a view is the logical outcome of a purely biological naturalistic view of man. Man and the world are at odds but man also finds fulfillment in the world. Psychoanalysis need not be as limited as it is however. It was the first approach to behavior that made a serious attempt to view the person as a product of his world. However man was seen purely as a passive victim of events. Psychoanalysis anticipates much of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, though in terms of its language of discourse. Freud sees the patient as governed by the fear of death, symbolized by castration anxiety. All which threatens this obliteration of identity is closed to the possibility of expression and all that is freed from this threat is opened to expression. Freud's "Where id was let ego be" expresses much of what Heidegger says. Daseinsanalysis however is able to say as much as Freud and go beyond because it is not compelled to reduce bahvior to the manipulable terms of the natural and physical sciences, but lets human behavior be accepted as it discloses itself. Freud's statement that human beings were not meant to keep secrets, in fact his entire theory of the determination of the repressed to find what limited expression that it can is an anticipation and confirmation of Heidegger's analysis of Being. However all approaches to human behavior

that regard man purely naturistically, take away all serious possibility of responsibility from him. Responsibility is rooted in the capacity for self-transcendence.

It is expected that Daseinsanalysis will be a means for the understanding of religious behavior because of its phenomenological nature. It accepts behavior as it presents itself as distinctively human and therefore does not have to reduce it to levels where religious behavior has no meaning, at the purely natural level.

CHAPTER III

THE RELEVANCE OF DASEINSANALYSIS FOR RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR

If the approach to human behavior known as Daseinsanalysis is to be fruitful for the understanding of religious behavior it might well be appropriate at this point to show how this is so. In other words the attempt must be made to answer the question: How can psychology elucidate man's encounter with God?

Fortunately the relevance of Heidegger's Daseinsanalyse to the Christian Faith is by itself a subject of profound interest and investigation in twentieth century Christian thought. Rudolf Bultmann (13) in particular is associated with this project. Tillich's ontological approach to theology is rooted in the thought of Heidegger, as is Brunner's work on the doctrine of man as well as Bonhoeffer's thought. There appear to be striking similarities between the so-called later Heidegger and Karl Barth (38).

Bultmanndescribes Heidegger's work as a secularized twentieth century restatement of St. Paul. The Marburg theologian finds that the hermeneutical problem implicit in the demythologization of the New Testament is answered by the existential philosophy of Heidegger. The New Testament and Heidegger see death as the enemy from which man flees. For the Old Testament man retreats to the security of the Law as the source of doing the right thing. For Heidegger

he falls into the security of conventionality, the world of the "they." Man is called in the New Testament by God's Word revealed in Jesus Christ to freedom and faith beyond death which has been vanquished in Christ. Dasein is called by the voice of conscience to the possibility of Being a Self in authentic openness to Being by resolutely taking death to himself thus living beyond fear. Both the New Testament and Heidegger, then, see death as the division between the old and fallen, and the new and risen life.

St. Paul long ago preceded Heidegger in making a division between the life of the flesh and the life of the Spirit. The former is life under the dominion of death, life held, restricted and closed by dread of death and condemnation. Such a life clings to the tangible objects of the world and the tangible rules of the law, just as inauthentic Dasein clings in dread to the tangible and secure rules of the "they." The life of the Spirit in St. Paul is freed by Christ from the bondage of fleshly concern to rely not upon the pleasures of the world nor upon the rules of the Law but only upon faith in the invisible world, the world of God's grace. Thus one lives by the Spirit or the invisible (but nonetheless real) world of grace in place of the visible, manipulable, controllable world of things. Dasein, similarly, lives by Being, or the invisible world of radical openness, in place of the visible, secure inauthentic selfless world of the "they."

There are obvious differences between the New Testament and Heidegger. The New Testament speaks of faith, not in the no-thingness and "contentlessness" of Being, but in the love of the personal and holy God who has revealed himself to be faithful in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from death, thus delivering us from all fear. This gracious deliverance by the living God is a far cry from Heidegger's defiant exhortation, to conquer death by resolutely taking the inevitability of death to oneself. Nonetheless both the New Testament and Heidegger do speak together of freedom from the cares of the world by living in a certain passivity upon the no-thingness of Being, which the Christian believes to be loving will which is revealed, and which Heidegger claims also reveals or discloses itself to those who wait upon it. The faith of which the Christian speaks makes possible a personal relationship. Heidegger does not go beyond man. It is only man who makes the revelation of Being discoverable or meaningful. Heidegger in fact has long been criticized for leaving each man as a self-enclosed unity heroically defying death. On the whole this seems to be an inaccurate criticism, but it has roots in a purely ontological system which cannot give meaning and content to notions of relation -ship and love.

Bultmann has rendered the Christian world a great service in bringing to light the profound similarities that do exist between Heidegger and the New Testament. He does seem to have fallen victim to a common human failing of

identifying himself too closely and uncritically with his master in getting his point across. Thus, although it is very helpful for modern man to be shown the significance of the Cross in terms meaningful to him, Bultmann has reduced the Cross exclusively to existential terms. The Cross calls each of us to take the Cross to ourselves by dying to attachment to the things of the world and rising to the authentic life of freedom because we accept the inevitability of death. There is truly this meaning in the Cross and Resurrection but surely there is much more besides. The point here is that though Bultmann has been very helpful he has tended to subordinate the Gospel to Heidegger's existentialism. Hopefully it remains possible to relate Heidegger and the New Testament and to use the former to clarify the latter.

In fact, there appears to have been a discernible change of emphasis in Heidegger's thought over the years, making it even more congenial to the structures of a Christian ontology. Heinrich Ott (38) Barth's successor at Basel has especially pursued this development in the later Heidegger. The very fact that according to Heidegger Dasein is grounded only in itself and not in anything outside itself means that it is grounded in nothing. As soon as the metaphysical preoccupation with the analysis of beings and their ground is overcome then the nothing that emerges is, in fact, Being. Man then no longer to Heidegger stands on nothing, but he becomes the shepherd of Being. A whole new positive emphasis is free to take over from the previous preoccupation with death and nothingness. Dasein is no longer rooted only in

its own authentic being, but in the 'wholly other' Being which discloses itself in Dasein (38,p.13). Thus Heidegger's thought turns from a "heroic nihilism" to an apparent religious sense of dependence. Karl Lowith, a student and major interpreter of Heidegger is quoted as saying that:

> "Those who will come closest to understanding (what Heidegger means by being) are believers who think they find in Heidegger's ontological talk of 'revelation' and 'unveiling' an access to the Christian revelation of a God who, too, is not a being, believers who as such do not pretend to comprehend with the reason the God of revelation." (38, p. 13-14)

Heidegger characterizes the poet Holderlin, of whom he has written so profoundly, as the poet who stands: "in the no-more of the departed gods and the no-yet of the coming (God)." (38, p.14). Thus the later Heidegger speaks of man as the shepherd of Being living in gratitude for Being's "favor" in place of living in anxiety before death. He sees thinking as a meditation, an awaiting for Being to disclose itself, to supply the basis for thought. Thinking is thanking Being for its favor in unveiling itself. Language is the "house of Being." Where authentic being had consisted primarily of anticipating one's death, it is now seen to consist of recovering the dimension of the whole and the holy, though still in the same terms of being open to the disclosure of Being, but in a mood of gratitude and even faith. Freedom is not so much one's ability to be, but one's letting Being be. Resolve is not the determination to be oneself, but one's openness to Being. The meaning of Being is the truth, the a-lethia or unveiling of Being.

Thus if Bultmann was able to show affinities between Heidegger and St. Paul, the gradual turn in Heidegger's thinking, which Bultmann and his followers are apparently loathe to acknowledge, makes the thought of Judeo-Christian revelation almost identical to the concept of Being for Heidegger. Hence it may be that we have in the new Heidegger the basis for a kind of Protestant natural theology, not based on man's discovery of God through nature, but on sola gratia, the openness of gratitude. Furthermore it would be a natural theology which is particularly agreeable to Barth's insistence that only as we see the world in the light of Christ or God's grace do we understand it as it truly is.

If all the aforementioned claims about the application of Heidegger's work are valid, i.e., both psychologically and theologically, then we have been happily provided with a psychology not only adequate for an understanding of religious behavior but ideal for that purpose. It is ideal because it clarifies religious understanding as much as it does our understanding of man. Having therefore found a way around the reductionist hindrance we are in a position to examine man's behavior as it presents itself, yet in depth. It is only when man's behavior can be studied on such a level, viz., phenomenologically, that his religious impulses can be understood meaningfully. We are now in a position to advance to a specific application of the phenomenological method to a problem in religious behavior: the prophet Ezekiel.

CHAPTER IV

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EZEKIEL

The prophet Ezekiel is surely one of the strangest personalities to be found in the Old Testament. Indeed he is probably its only major figure for whom the adjective bizarre is not an exaggeration. Not surprisingly the behavior of many Old Testament personalities is at times unusual by present day standards. In the light of the historical period, the level of civilization, the limitations of their understanding, and the particular circumstances to which the various characters were subject over the approximately 1500 years of Old Testament history it is to be expected that much that went on should be alien to our understanding. In fact when the aforementioned circumstances are considered most of the behavior is rendered coherent at least, and surprisingly contemporary at best. It is amazing to what extent the warmth and depth of human relationships come alive in its pages. We can go far back into the dim legendary past of the Patriarchs, to the colorful tale of Joseph, the conflicting passions of Moses, the tragic deterioration of Saul, the fast friendship of David and Jonathan, the lust of David for Bathsheba, and this mourning for his dying son, the suffering that drove Job to demand justice, the despair of Jeremiah, the list is as endless as the characters themselves. There seems to be one character in the Old Testament however to whom it is difficult to go out to in empathy or understanding. Ezekiel's behavior is bizarre. He is legalistic, apparently

unsympathetic, until the Fall of Jerusalem, and pedantic. Though his prophecies make up one of the longest books in the Old Testament, he is frequently almost ignored in major studies of the prophets, as witness especially Heschel's definitive work (20)where Ezekiel receives no special treat -ment. Ezekiel is a strange mixture of prophet and priest mystic and legalist. Probably no man in the Old Testament approaches him as a visionary yet he is often accused of lacking in imagination. Surely no other Old Testament figure has provided such a broad target for psychologists, amateur and otherwise. To many the case is indisputable; he is psychotic. To others he is the supreme visionary and mystic of the Old Testament, any abnormality in his personality being not an unexpected feature of his mysticism. In spite, however, of the readiness of so many to dispose of Ezekiel with a diagnostic label, it is found, upon closer examination that there have been few thorough and serious attempts to understand Ezekiel's personality. Most investigators, Jaspers for instance, have been content to dismiss him to the ranks of the psychotic and the deranged with no more than a sentence or paragraph at most. Others, mostly Old Testament scholars, want to try and ignore the all too apparent abnormalities in his behavior, and gloss them over as if any admission of derangement would render suspect his place as a prophet of Israel. Perhaps only Lindblom (28) among Old Testament scholars, in his excellent and exhaustive treatment of the

prophets, has made a serious attempt to understand Ezekiel's behavior, in his attempts to shed light on the dynamics of prophecy. Of course Biblical scholars cannot be blamed for shying away from a field where they have no professional competance. The futility of their doing so is amply demonstrated in the only extended attempt to submit Ezekiel's behavior to psychoanalytic examination: that by E.C. Broome (10) - an attempt which can only be described as disastrous. Broome arrives at the conclusion that Ezekiel was a schizophrenic of either the catatonic or more probably the paranoid variety. He is answered rather comprehensively by C.H. Howie (22) who takes apart just about everything that Broome says, as he discards his treatment of Ezekiel with contempt.

Both of these two men fall short of doing justice to the problem presented by Ezekiel's behavior. This study will therefore be an attempt to present a solution to the problem of Ezekiel which steers clear of both extremes - the Scylla of psychologism and the Charybdis of ignoring the problem. Using the methodology of existential phenomonology or Dasinsanalysis which takes human behavior on all levels seriously and has no desire to reduct it, not even to psychopathology, the attempt will be made to shed light on Ezekiel's behavior in such a way as not only to take his messages seriously but to show that it has an importance that if often overlooked in the confusion wrought by the apparent bizzarity of his behavior. Up until now when Ezekiel has been

examined he has been subjected to analysis either by those who would detract from the importance of the message by questioning the sanity of its deliverer, or by those who would elevate him beyond understanding for fear that his message be disparaged. It is the thesis of this work that neither extreme is fruitful or necessary. Ezekiel can be understood as a person in a state of severe conflict while remaining one of ancient Israel's great prophets. However it cannot be denied that Ezekiel shows signs of gross abnormality even when the age in which he lived, and the unusual activity allowed the Israelite prophet are taken into consideration. Many of the prophets did strange things that by modern standards, disregarding the Israelite ethos and what was expected of the prophet, would lead us to question their sanity. Amos rudely crashed the prophetic circle and denounced in outrageous terms Israelite religious and social practices. Hosea remarried his wife, who since became a harlot, in order to teach an object-lesson; the otherwise sober and aristocratic Isaiah walked "naked" through the streets of Jerusalem for three years (Is. 20); Jeremiah wore an oxe's yolk around his neck, then an iron yolk (Jer. 27 & 28), and on another occasion apparently walked several hundred miles to bury his waistcloth and brought it back to show as an object-lesson (Jer. 13). It is not only however because Ezekiel did strange things, even if he did more strange things than other prophets, that he is suspected of mental imbalance. He sat overwhelmed as if in a cataleptic trance or having a catatonic episode for one week after his call to prophecy. (Ez. 3: 14 - 15).

He experienced an immobility as if bound and speechlessness not long after, again similar in outward symptomatology to a catatonic episode (Ez. 3:25-27), which may have lasted as long as seven and one-half years (Ez. 24:26-27; 33:21-22). He also apparently lay on one side for 390 days and on the other for forty days unable to move during this time (Ez. 4:5-8). During this time he is supposed to have eaten among other things barley cake baked on human dung (Ez.4:12). Most of these acts had symbolic significance just as did the strange acts of Ezekiel's predecessors. However what separates the acts of Ezekiel from the other prophets is that many of his acts, if they are as reported, are not only bizarre but they are under any normal circumstances impossible. The only phenomenon in human experience that they resemble in fact are symptoms of catatonic schizophrenia.

It can be said that Ezekiel did not do what is attributed to him, but that seems to be merely an arbitrary judgment to get off the hook. If he did anything like what the record states, then, even allowing for some exaggerations, his behavior seems to go beyond the excesses of prophetic ecstacy and passes into the realm of psychotic behavior. There are simply no other explanations for his behavior. Having said all of this however it remains the thesis of this work that Ezekiel is one of Israel's greatest and most important prophets.

THE HISTORICAL SETTING OF EZEKIEL

Under King Josiah (640-609), a thorough religio -political purge or reform came to a head in the truncated "Israel" that was the Kingdom of Judah. The Northern Kingdom, Israel had through conquest ceased to exist in 721B.C. This reform reached its climax around 622-21 with the discovery of the Deuteronomic law-book which gave the need for reform the added impetus of a coherent theology. The local shrines to Yahweh were prescribed because of the syncretism that tended to result due to the association of the shrines with the high places of Baalism. There was instead to be one central place of worship in the Jerusalem temple. This was attempted in order to remove, as already noted, the syncretistic temptations of Baalism implicit in location in the rural areas where fertility cults inevitably had flourished, along with the corruption of practices which had resulted from the decentralization of worship. Jerusalem worship would replace these it was hoped by a centralized, controlled, orderly and correct from of worship under the Jerusalem priests. The Deuteronomic ethic also had an underlying ethic and heilsgeschichte which expressed the doctrine of divine retribution: righteousness, obedience and proper worship would be rewarded by Yahweh; wickedness, disobedience, and improper worship would be punished.

The reform began very enthusiastically and was carried through with the utmost thoroughness. Probably because of these factors, the task being outwardly accomplished, and

correct worship established with a hierarchy in control, a feeling of self-satisfaction emerged. When matters are outwardly in order people tend to become unaware and lose sight of the need for inner vigilance. They rest on their oars, as Toynbee puts it (41). Judah felt that it had a claim on Yahweh's favor and protection; that it need not fear the alien armies that threatened it. Automatic protection was brought, they thought, by outer compliance, as says Bright, (9 - p.302).

The death in battle of Josiah in 609 however dealt a severe moral as well as material blow to Judah. Not only did it lose its short-lived independence as a result but the whole Deuteronomic theology seemed vitiated. "Compliance with Deuteronomic demands," says Bright, "had not forestalled disaster" (9-p.304). Under Josiah's successor Jehoiakim the reform lapsed. Religious laxity returned and pagan practices were revived; the reform itself appears to have been imposed against (or at least indifferent to) the popular feeling, certainly in the countryside.

In 605 there was a sudden change in the balance of power in the fertile crescent. Nebuchadnezzar's forces thoroughly defeated the army of Egypt laying open the way to Syria and Palestine for the forces of Babylonia. The latter were temporarily forestalled by internal matters but returned to threaten Judah and throw her into consternation, though at this time she did not attack. As of old Judah allied herself with Egypt, after all, Jehoiakim had been crowned by

Pharaoh Necho. At first her choice seemed indicated as Egypt fought a border-force of Nebuchadnezzar to at least a stalemate in 601. Encouraged by this Jehoiakim foolishly rebelled against Babylonian hegemony. Nebuchadnezzar did not attack at once but bided his time until it was convenient for him. Meanwhile he kept Judah off balance by such forces of his own as were available along with the guerrilla forces of Arameans, Moabites, and Ammonites. In 598 Nebuchadnezzar finally attacked Judah. That very month Jehoiakim died or was assassinated. Three months later Jerusalem surrendered; expected Egyptian help was not forthcoming. The new king Jehoiachin, the queen mother, high officials and leading citizens, together with a large booty were taken to Babylon along with, presumably, Ezekiel, as a leading citizen and priest. The old man, Zedekiah was invested to rule in Jehoiachin's stead.

With what appears to be not only incredible stupidity but almost a suicidal impulse Judah continued to conspire and foment trouble. Despite the warnings of Jeremiah they acted out of blind patriotism and unwarranted self-confidence and continued to depend on Egypt. Zedekiah, apparently a well -meaning but weak and easily-led king depended on the advice of his nobles, most of whom were benefiting from the absence of the leading citizenry in exile. Judah finally rose in rebellion led on by more enthusiasm than wisdom. Nebuchadnezzar acted swiftly. By 588 his army had arrived at the gates of

Jerusalem and laid seige. The hope raised that an Egyptian army was on its way with relief was laid to rest by its defeat, and the siege was renewed. After a heroic resistance Jerusalem succumbed as Nebuchadnezzar breached its walls. Zedekiah was captured trying to escape. He was forced to witness the execution of his sons, then he was blinded and taken away to Babylon where he died. Jerusalem was razed, many of its ecclesiastical, military and civil officers were executed and many others deported to Babylon where they lived in exile. All these events, not surprisingly, led to a crisis in the Israelite faith. Their conviction that they were God's Chosen People was dealt a severe blow. Even if they could allow for or interpret 597 as Yahweh's disciplinary action they never expected that he would permit their total destruction, and worst of all the conquest of Jerusalem and the destruction of the temple. Doubts had begun to arise as events grew worse but with their final ignominy doubts of Yahweh's power and sovereignty raged, along with questions about his righteousness and justice. Other gods were propitiated as a result (Ez. 8) since they seemed to be blessing their worshippers with conquest and power. It was in order to justify the strange ways of Yahweh that first Jeremiah and then Ezekiel spoke their uncompromising messages of warning, doom and repentance to Israel. In Ezekiel's messages Yahweh had actually abandoned Zion and no longer inhabited his house (Ez. 8:12). Only in a new age would he return when Israel was cleansed of its sin and renewed by Yahweh's grace and power (Ez. 11:17-21).

During the period of exile Judah appears to have lost its identity. Its leadership was gone and its faith in Yahweh's power vitiated. The Yahwism that remained was doubtless very corrupted. The exiles in Babylon were not maltreated any more than a slave-population normally is. Very much the opposite appears to have been the case in fact, for in the freedom which they enjoyed there many seem to have prospered, and when at last they were liberated comparatively few returned. Nonetheless their faith in Yahweh was severely shaken. It seems only to have been the inspired utterances of first Jeremiah, and then Ezekiel, followed later by the unknown prophet whom we call Deutero-Isaiah that rendered their plight meaningful and even providential and thus enabled Israel to maintain their faith in Yahweh. By announcing Israel's fall as Yahweh's righteous judgment on their apostasy and sin they gave the ignominy not only coherent explanation but enabled it to be viewed not as a contradiction but even as an indication of Israel's faith in Yahweh. The major prophets of the pre-856 period, Jeremiah in Judah, and Ezekiel in (we suppose) Babylon seem to have pronounced a message of unrelieved doom in order to convict Israel of its sin. As Israel began to understand the ways of Yahweh and to show signs of repentance, a vision of hope was given to them. It is probably this change of mood on Israel's part and consequent redemptive Word that we see reflected in the progression of the book of Ezekiel. The message of doom had done its work,

because the temple had been destroyed. God had struck with His fist. Now the hope and vision of restoration which was needed was given. God would now raise Judah up with his right arm. Ezekiel's voice seems to have been stilled after 570. There remained however twenty-five years of exile. It was in these later years that a prophet arose appropriate to the needs of the people, bearing a message of comfort, hope and bright vision. Thus throughout the exile the prophetic message seems to have been providentially keyed to the needs of the people at each particular stage in their experience.

As to the actual person Ezekiel we know very little only that he was a priest who spoke to his fellow exiles in Babylon (though some scholars maintain that he remained in Palestine). Many of his utterances seem more comprehensible if spoken in Palestine, particularly the otherwise very awkward occurences in chapters eight to twelve. On the other hand however it seems that there would have been little reason to place him in Babylon if he was not there already as the book bearing his name clearly states. Little would have been accomplished or clarified by an artificial transfer of his ministry to a more awkward locale. Furthermore, his message was an effort to vindicate the ways of Yahweh to the people of Israel wherever they were for they were all smarting under the events of the immediate past and present, and all sought an understanding of the recent events which all had suffered, expecially the exiles. Ezekiel may have returned to Palestine

upon occasion but this would not be necessary for him to obtain a rather detailed knowledge of life in Palestine. It is known from Jeremiah (Jer. 29) that the lines of communication were very busy between Palestine and the exiled community. Thus there would seem to be little point in giving Ezekiel an inconvenient and unnecessary locale in Babylon if he was not already there. Many attempts have been made to explain his return to Jerusalem "in visions." A further attempt will be made later in this work to add new light to how this singular event may have transpired. In conclusion let it be said from a historical point of view, apart from any questions of "madness" Ezekiel played an irreplaceable role in enlightening, chastising and encouraging the exiled instruments as he fulfilled the mission to which God had called him.

THE NATURE OF ISRAELITE PROPHECY

The danger of any psychological study of an historic personage is that his behavior might be taken completely out of context and present-day standards of behavior applied to him. By such methods many strong figures of man's prescientific past can be shown to hold such irrational (to us) views that their sanity would appear open to question. Thus the attempt has been made to suggest the historical context in which Ezekiel appeared and acted. It is now necessary to place Ezekiel in his context as an Israelite prophet. These men comprised an extraordinary group of individuals distinctive probably in world history. Not that there is nothing at all

comparable to the prophets of Israel anywhere else in history. But the potent blend of passionate religious fervor, the overwhelming sense of vocation, and its application to the immediate cares of the community relating to profound reverence for the communities past yet pointing toward a redeemed future is undoubtedly without parallel. Lindhom's exhaustive study (28) shows that expressions like prophecy took place all over the world. These men who claimed nothing for themselves, everything for Yahweh and his will vis-a-vis the Covenant and community are undoubtedly the pen-ultimate stage in man's religious development -second only to the incomparable Jesus Christ who stands as the greatest of their line.

Psychological investigations of the prophets seem to have fallen into desrepute in recent years. The psychologism of those who used and misused Freudian methods, Broome for instance, (10) tended to reduce the religious and moral elements of the prophets to pathological symptomatology and we are well rid of it. However in repudiating the inadequacies and excesses of the psychological approach to religious phenomena, particularily prophecy, there is a great danger of being reduced to obscurantism and irrelevance in how prophetic phenomena take place. The error of the psychological approach was not only that it reduced the behavior of the prophets to pathological categories but that it was incapable of conveiving the reality of their experiences as going beyond the subjectivity of the prophets themselves. Psychology as a tool to understand

religious phenomena was, as the first part of this thesis noted, quite unable to take the subject matter seriously because it could not do justice, even had it wanted, to any kind of transcendent reality. Furthermore the only creative and dynamic approach to psychology that has existed has consisted of variations of the Freudian theme, either following it, revising it or reacting against it. Since psychoanalysis grew almost solely out of contact with pathological behavior any attempt to use it as a tool to understand any level of human behavior was bound to attribute it to pathological causation. The two were combined: the naturalism of psychology in general and the pathological emphasis of psychoanalysis in particular, in order to come to terms with behavior for which even together they were totally inadequate.

Thus the psychological approach to the understanding of prophetic behavior was repudiated, but as we can see things now, a much better verdict then the relevant "inadequate" is some such judgment as "not ready." Instead the understanding of the prophets as it has proceeded for about thirty years has emphasized their theological significance. We really are no further in our understanding of what constitutes a confrontation of the prophet with the call of Yahweh than we were in the days when it was attributed to the audible voice of Yahweh. The only exception to this development came in Otto's Idea of the Holy which, though not a psychological work primarily, helped to shed light on the effect in an

individual of an experience of numinous reality. Otto of course was primarily interested in the religious dimensions of such an experience. We still have no understanding of how such an experience is received by an individual. Thus we have no understanding of the overwhelming experiences which shock the prophets of Israel and thus raised them up to supernormal heights of perception, insight and prescience into the will of God. Even Lindblom's work on prophecy, though very attentive to what can be understood of the psychological dimensions of prophecy, is unable to go very much beyond an approach. While it is very helpful it remains essentially descriptive.

How then can we understand the prophetic experience while remaining true to its religious significance? First it must be understood that what is known as prophecy follows a long tradition not only in Israel but in the Semitic world. Seers and ecstatic visionaries who appeared to be seized by alien powers and granted special and unusual powers were prevalent it appears throughout the religions of the ancient Near East. More than that, prophets appear to have had a long tradition of existence in Egypt, Canaan, Mesopotamia, and most pre-eminently Zoroaster, and finally Muhammad. To be seized in a kind of "absorption" ecstasy is not the experience that is associated with the prophets of Israel. Such phenomena seem to have occured in more primitive Israel and among the

Canaanites. Undoubtedly throughout the ancient world all those who were victims of epilepsy or who were deranged were conceived to be under spirit possession. In such cases the individual is utterly helpless in the grip of the seizure. As well as epileptics and psychotics falling into this category, probably the favor attached to such behavior encouraged people to give vent to impulse, for any uncharacter-istic activity of a person, any sudden impulsive act was probably attributed to an invisible power outside the person i.e., a spirit.

When we attempt to understand prophecy we are moving to a much higher level of behavior. There, men obviously felt themselves to be instruments of a higher power, but they were willful instruments. They were often extremely reluctant to obey the "call" to prophesy, Moses, Jeremiah and Ezekiel most particularly. But having been convicted they knew that they had to assume the role. Even their most bizarre actions from the moment of the call are deliberate ones. Indeed there does not seem to be any record of any of the classical or canonical prophets acting under a trance or in any way acting in spite of himself, except perhaps for Ezekiel's catalepsy after his fist call, and his visions of God in which he feels transported from place to place.

Indeed Heschel (20) insists throughout his monumental work on the prophets that the true prophet was never a victim or an object of ecstasy. He never loses his own subjectivity as a bearer of the divine word but offers himself freely as its vehicle in the world. It is interesting in the light of

the distinction between the prophet on one hand and ecstatics visionaries and mystics on the other that Heschel finds room for no special treatment of Ezekiel.

If however voluntary openness to the will and the Word of God is the special distinction of the Israelite prophet, how are we to understand what occurs to the personality of the prophet? He apparently remains at the same time fully himself and fully God's mouthpiece. Such a definition of the prophet is remarkably similar to the great credal Christological definitions, especially Nicea and Chalcedon. This is a way of saying that man is most fully man when he is fully open to the divine. In terms of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, Dasein is the shepherd of Being, who is therefore most open to his potentialities for being a self when he is most open to disclosing the fullness of Being. Nowhere is the character of the prophetic role as channel of the objective divine Word more specifically described than in Ezekiel's call vision. Here he is commanded to eat the scroll containing the divine Word which is to be spoken (Ez. 2:10-3:3).

Thus it would appear to be no exaggeration to say at this point that Heidegger's Daseinsanalysis gives us a fresh way of understanding the psychology of the prophet of God which need not in any way diminish his distinctiveness and integrity as an agent of God's will. A man is a prophet or a spokesman of God when he is fully open, or waits upon the Word of God to the specific situation in which he finds himself (in Judeo-Christian terms) or when he is the most

open to disclosing all the possible potentialities of Being, (in Daseinsanalytic terms). Nowhere do we better see described the implications of Heidegger's new emphasis on the encounter with Being as the experience of the holy or wholeness than throughout the Biblical records, but especially in the prophets (see especially the call visions of Isaiah -Is. 6- or Jer. 1, or Ezekiel cc. 1-3). Here too is where as in Otto's Idea of the Holy the Numinosum becomes tremendum.

In the experience of the prophets in yielding to the call of Yahweh there is a sense in which the prophet is seized upon and is in a state of ecstasy and inspiration so that he feels other than himself. The number of times that the prophets speak of being seized by the hand of Yahweh (Amos 7:15, Jer. 15:17, Is. 61:1, Is. 49) demonstrates the experience of the prophets as being ecstatic - standing outside themselves. Yet this is in no way different from what Heidegger describes as the way that Dasein should experience the fullness of Being. The experience of the wholeness and unity of Being is so alien to modern man that a description of it seems almost utterly strange to him, though it is an experience that the artist may still have in times of extravagant creation. It may also be the experience made possible by those who have taken LSD and other such drugs. It may well be that such drugs in totally releasing constricted, alienated, dichotomized modern man from his controls and inhibitions enables him to fully experience the

fullness and unity of Being. Such at any rate appears to be how such experiences are described. Furthermore Heidegger's thesis would seem to be confirmed that there was a stage in man's development when he was not as alienated from Being as he now is. Hebrew life and thought, particularly as it appears in the prophets seems to shed light on such a period and the experiences which it yielded.

There are differences in what is understood to occur of course, and these have been mentioned above. The Jew and Christian think in terms of a personal relationship of command from God and wilful obedience on the part of man. The existentialist does not think or speak in specifically personal terms but his manner of describing what occurs when one is fully open to Being in gratitude is so close to describing a personal relationship that perhaps the best analogy to make the description understandable is what happens in the God-to-man relationship. At any rate it would appear that we are now in a position to test the relevance of the Daseinsanalytic understanding of human behavior to the specifically religious behavior of the prophet Ezekiel. One step more must be taken however before we can proceed directly to the specific application: an examination of the literature which has sought to understand Ezekiel's behavior.

CHAPTER V

REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

There appear to have been only two attempts available in English (and to the writer) which are in any way extensive that deal with the questions surrounding Ezekiel's personality as such. They are the studies, already alluded to, of Broome and Howie. Of course any serious treatment of the Israelite prophets has to speak of Ezekiel, (with as noted the strange exception of Heschel) but few such writers have gone past pure description with perhaps as brief acknowledgment that the prophet exhibits some unusual behavioral patterns. A few, notably Lindblom (28) and Widengren (43) have made attempts to account for some of Ezekiel's more unusual behavior. Lindblom is willing to admit that Ezekiel was given to abnormal experiences of a neurotic sort such as aphasis (3:26, 14:27, 33:21 ff) while waiting for news from Jerusalem and hysterical paralysis (4:4 ff). Lindblom also deals at length with some psychological dimensions of the phenomenon of prophecy wherein he draws many useful distinctions, some of which are contained in the above section on the nature of prophecy. He does not deal however in any depth with the personal dynamics of any prophet's behavior. This is to be expected and commended for a Biblical scholar is not expected, for the most part,

to be competent to deal with behavioral dynamics; especially of an historical personage of 2500 years ago, of whom almost nothing is actually known. Thus the opinions of Biblical scholars in general on Ezekiel's sanity, or lack of it, and of the nature of his visionary experiences can be based on little more than personal opinion and individual credulity. Widengren (43) for instance defends the parapsychological reality of Ezekiel's visions of Jerusalem from Babylon. Other authorities find it impossible, undesirable and unnecessary to rely upon a phenomenon the reality of which is yet so open to question to explain what was happening to Ezekiel at that time.

Carl Jung in his voluminous writings, occasionally refers to Ezekiel's visions. The writer has frequently come across such references but they are difficult to trace down for someone who does not have access to Jung's complete works. Nonetheless Jung's position can be stated as the following: Ezekiel's vision of God with its abundance of four points of the compass, four wheels, represents a mandala, a symbol which appears throughout history as a symbol of completion, and in the dreams of persons coming through a crisis and now hovering on the verge of self-fulfilment. To Jung therefore it would appear that Ezekiel may have come through a crisis perhaps of a psychotic nature, but the prognosis is excellent. He is being presented with the opportunity of responding to the call to individuation or self-realization. This writer

finds Jung's interpretation to be a very helpful key to the understanding of Ezekiel's experience and one upon which he will elaborate although within a different methodological and theoretical framework. Jung unfortunately goes no further. It is perhaps a pity that he never brought the full range of his incredibly vast knowledge of ancient imagery and his insight into its role in psychic growth to a prophet who so seems to lend himself to Jung's approach, instead of merely referring to him en passant.

We are left therefore only with the contributions of Broome and Howie. Let us examine them, first Broome and then Howie, to determine the strengths and weaknesses in the attempts of these two men to understand Ezekiel. The task of taking Broome apart has already had a good start, thanks to Howie's almost wholly critical approach to Broome's paper. Broome has scarcely begun his paper before he has categorically diagnosed Ezekiel as a schizophrenic exhibiting catatonic and paranoid features. Before we go any further in examining Broome's analysis it will be necessary to take a lengthy digression in order to describe certain characteristics of schizophrenia which bear both on Broome's study and eventually to some degree on the present one. It will be seen below that an existential phenomenological approach does not find the categorization of behavior either necessary or helpful in understanding the human person. However at this point the terminology of the traditional approach to psychopathology

must still be described even in order to show why such an approach is no longer desirable.

Broome seems most convinced that it is the paranoid form of schizophrenia from which Ezekiel suffers. We will therefore deal with that approach first of all. Paranoid schizophrenia is differentiated from other schizophrenias by ideas of reference, i.e., ordinary happenings have special reference to the patient, and delusions, usually of persecution or grandeur. Where the personality is relatively well preserved the delusions may well be systematized, i.e., organized around certain central ideas. Hallucinations especially auditory are common, although in a fairly well preserved personality they may be totally absent. The paranoid usually remains in better contact with reality than other forms of schizophrenia and he usually does not deteriorate or regress to the same extent as others. He may in fact remain at a fairly mild level of the disease for many years, and not even require hospitalization. His ideas of reference and his delusions and suspiciousness may make him merely antagonistic and rebellious but frequently violent. Historical religious figures provide tempting targets for amateur psychologists who see in their often overwhelming sense of vocation by God symptoms of ideas of reference and delusions of grandeur. Furthermore the conflict that such persons often have with their society which rejects their warnings and persecutes them gives occasion for the amateur psychologist

to diagnose delusions of persecution. This shows the dangers of studying individuals out of historical context. Behavior surely cannot be labelled as pathological when it is acceptable within a given society. This is a truism that should not need repeating. So that whenever paranoid diagnoses are glibly used on historical persons there is cause for skepticism. The case would not only have to be examined thoroughly in terms of what the bounds of acceptable behavior were, but the behavior of the subject would have to be so bizarre and the delusions so much beyond the limits of reality that such a diagnosis would have to be inescapable for it to be acceptable.

The symptoms of catatonic schizophrenia are probably less subject to historical contingencies. It is characterized first by a period of extreme excitement, apparently aimless activity and agitation. The patient then slows down, eventually reaching a state of almost total inactivity. He may be unable to move around or take care of his physical needs and have to be confined to bed. This stage is known as catatonic stupor. The patient is not, as he seems, paralyzed. What is disturbed is his capacity to will. He cannot will and therefore cannot even will to move. He may be very obedient and suggestible because he is following the will of someone else and therefore cannot be held responsible for what he does. His body may thus be placed in the most awkward positions and remain there for hours.

Delusions and hallucinations are often present although they cannot be elicited because the patient will not communicate. Often they are of a cosmic and catastrophic quality. So fearful has the patient become of willing and so terrified is he of the consequences that he has become deluded into thinking that if he wills or moves the world will collapse or the universe will dissolve. The general behavior of the catatonic schizophrenic person is characterized by peculiar mannerisms grimaces and peculiar acts, in short, activities that will be regarded as meaningless to others and for which he himself will not be held responsible.

Characteristic of all types of schizophrenia is what is called 'concretization of the concept.' To the schizophrenic so many areas of life are anxiety-provoking that, in order to avoid them, he regresses to the more primitive concrete manner of thinking so that the terrorizing intangible becomes the feared but tangible object to be avoided. Concepts and abstractions become concrete, thus indefinite feeling becomes specific, the imperceptible becomes perceptible, and the vague menace becomes the specific threat. This is an active and not only a passive process for the schizophrenia person transforms the abstract into the concrete. Hallucinations are the most typical examples of perceptualizing concepts. Inner experiences are also projected to the external objective world. As part of the defense structure the delusions and hallucinations are characterized by refractoriness or

incorrigibility. In other words, the patient so needs to perceive as he does that he clings tenaciously to his interpretations. Thus the experiences of the schizophrenic person that seem symbolic and metaphorical to the normal person are intensely real and concrete to him.

Another interesting feature of schizophrenia that may bear on the present study is the 'level of perceived causation.' The schizophrenic person instead of finding a physcial explanation for an event finds its cause in a personal motivation or intention. "The necessary antecedent of any event" (to the schizophrenic person), says Arieti"is an act of will" (2, p.483). This phenomenon is particularly characteristic of paranoids. In catatonic one's own will becomes the antecedent of events.

Particularly characteristic of the catatonic variety of schizophrenia, and also of special interest for the present study, is, as already alluded to, the paralysis of the will. It is thought that catatonia develops in those who from child -hood were prevented from developing confidence in their capacity to will. They were forced either not to will or to follow the directions of others. When they did act independently they were criticized and made to feel guilty. The developing catatonic seeks to remove anxiety associated with willing by compliance or obsessive compulsive actions and attention to minutiae. If these do not ward off anxiety catatonia develops. Catatonia is thus a removal of action in order to remove the anxiety associated with willed action.

In less advanced cases of catatonia the victim begins an action, becomes afraid of willing and withdraws it, but decides that not to perform is an act of will and is again afraid. He is trapped in what is to him a horrifying dilemna. The culmination of catatonia occurs in so-called negative omnipotence where the patient feels that if he moves or wills the whole world will collapse, or all mankind will perish.

With this quite incomplete sketch of certain features of schizophrenia which may bear on the present study or make parts of it more comprehensible to those unacquainted with the world of the schizophrenic person it should now be possible to return to the discussion of Broome's analysis of Ezekiel.

Broome begins rather inauspiciously, or should it be said, suspiciously, with a clever but, it would appear cavalier manipulation of the text by bringing 3:15, 3:24, 4:4-5, 4:8, and 3:26 together in that order. The rather presumptuous rendering of the text now conveniently reads as follows:

> 3:15 - I sat there overwhelmed among them seven days.
> 3:24 - And the spirit entered into me and said unto me...."Go shut thyself within thy house.
> 4:4-5 - And thou lie upon the left side and thou shalt hear the iniquity of the house of Israel unto the number of 390 days.
> 4:8, 3:26 - And behold, I lay bands upon thee, and thou shalt not turn from one side to another, and thou shalt not go out among them. And I will make thy tongue cleave to the roof of thy mouth, and thou shalt be dumb, and shalt not be to them a reporter. (10,p.79)

Having thus treated the text Broome can do of Ezekiel what he will. Bringing together a series of Ezekiel's actions so that they prove one's point would seem to be a very

unconvincing way of demonstrating one's point. When one is making a point the responsibility is his to demonstrate that the evidence is contained in the material. Any manipulation must not only have almost inescapable grounds but manipulation that readily proves one's position must be regarded with dubiety. At any rate Broome feels at this point that he has demonstrated irrefutable evidence of catatonic schizophrenia. Howie rightly observes that any figure of antiquity (or of any day) could be shown to be mad or anything else of a rather incriminating nature by arbitrarily selecting and rearranging his actions. The only justification Broome gives is that later scribes, wishing to protect Ezekiel or else bewildered by what was written, altered the text in Ezekiel's favor. Since madness was, if anything a sign of divine favor in antiquity, and especially for Israel if it proceeded from a great phophet, such a hypothetical wish to protect Ezekiel would seem to have poor foundation and at best to be purely speculative.

The bands placed around Ezekiel demonstrate that either he was psychotic and had to be restrained by his fellow Israelites, or that he <u>felt</u> restrained and was therefore a victim of hallucinations. In any case according to Broome this is evidence that he was deranged (10, p.280).

Ezekiel, says Broome, merely thought he had built a replica of Jerusalem and that he baked cakes of weird receipes, more signs of the delusional nature of schizophrenia. Later however Broome states that the use of human dung as an ingredient

in the recipes is categorically symptomatic of psychosis, apparently by the way, unaware of the common use even today of animal dung as a fuel in the Middle and Far East. In one case, Ezekiel's action was apparently merely a fantasy, and in the other case it was acted out. Does this mean two separate indications of schizophrenia or has the author merely been confused by his enthusiasm? At any rate it suggests that not only is Broome arbitrary in his use of the materials, but careless and opportunistic in his use of them to further his purposes.

He also builds diagnostic material out of the questionable assumption that the thirtieth year referred to was Ezekiel's thirtieth year. (Ez. 1:1) This may be granted. However the conclusion that Broome derives from a fairly innocuous and even perhaps helpful biographical fact is that it demonstrates ideas of reference and megalomania (10, p.282), because Ezekiel orients all events around himself. This is surely a fantastic assumption on Broome's part. The fire of the vision refers to the nameless terror of the paranoid state. The vision in its totality is made up of ingredients from his Babylonian surroundings distorted by his psychotic state (10, p. 283). Masochism is supposed to be indicated by the ferocity of the animal faces, as is anxiety (10, p.284). In examining each of these as ertions we find first of all that the paranoid state is usually characterized by the delusion of specific threats ('conretization of the concept') not nameless terrors which tend to be prepsychotic. It is generally agreed

that the vision is a synthesis of contemporary Babylonian and other oriental ingredients but it is presumptuous to say that they are distorted by his psychic state. Even if they seem to us a strange accumulation of images the fact that it was a symbol of the Godhead may account at least as much for their strangeness as would any psychotic condition. Furthermore, as Howie points out, if enough were known Ezekiel's vision might well be found to be quite appropriate. With regard to the aspect of the animal faces we are given no indication that, as Broome says, they are threatening. Thus it is unwarranted to characterize this as an indicator of masochism. In fact masochism is a generic term, and to describe it as a type of behavior apart from specific dynamics is meaningless.

Narcissism (self-love) is seen by Broome in the visitation of the vision of God to Ezekiel. If this is to be a valid interpretation of Ezekiel's call then almost every character of significance in the Old Testament, especially the prophets are self-absorbed and deluded. Either God did confront them or they are fools deluded by their own sense of self-importance. Ezekiel is diagnosed to be suffering from a narcissistic-masochistic conflict (10, p.284). This is an impressive use of terminology, but narcissism is as meaningless a term, unless used in connection with overall psychoanalytic naivete. He sees castration themes in the command to take a sword to his hair (10, p.288). The ubiquity of the eyes always turned on Ezekiel regardless of the direction the creatures are going is indicative of a paranoid hallucination, says Broome (10, p.285).

The vision itself furthermore represents an "influence machine" which is especially symptomatic of paranoid schizophrenia. (10, p.285). At this point Broome's position is at its weakest. While a complicated vision such as that of Ezekiel may be symptomatic of psychotic thought processes it is not only unwarranted but ridiculous to extrapolate backwards to a time and circumstance when such visions with such ingredients may well have been not only acceptable but undoubtedly a sign of divine favor. By such a standard Socrates' inner voice becomes pathognomic, as does in fact the call of every prophet, and the entire prescientific world's belief in the ubiquity and omnicausality of spirits.

Ezekiel is seen to be obsessed by persecutory delusions in attributing blame for his own troubles and those of the Jews to Jaazaniah, Pelatiah and the other elders of Israel (Ez. 8 and 9) (10, p.289). Grandiosity is indicated by the Gog and Magog prophecies (Ez. 38) and extreme megalomania by the bringing to life of the bones in the vision in the valley thereof (Ez. 337) (10, p.291).

Though Broome makes a perfunctory assertion that none of his "findings" detract from Ezekiel's greatness (10,p.292) it is difficult indeed to find any greatness at all if he was so withdrawn into his psychotic fantasy world that he never actually made his prophecies, or performed any symbolic actions, and if all his writings were but the rembling self-absorbed delusions of a paranoid. When all is said however, even if what Broome said about Ezekiel fitted the description of him

that we have, it tells us nothing about Ezekiel in terms of what motivated his strange actions. Broome simply tags Ezekiel's activities with impressive psychoanalytic labels, with complete disregard for the cultural and historical context in which the prophet lived. To Broome schizophrenia is not understood as a conceptual device to categorize certain similar types of pathological behavior. Rather, it is a disease entity as invariant in its symptomatology as scarlet fever, tuberculosis or measles. This approach is quite at variance with much recent thinking in the field of psychiatry and psychology. Many authorities are now beginning to wonder whether schizophrenia even exists as an entity, or whether it might be not even a very accurate categorization of certain similar reactions to the disintegration of the sufferer's world.

In defense of Broome it must be said however that he has pointed out, as few others have dared, many of the anomalies in Ezekiel's behavior which can only be accounted for on the understanding that the prophet shows signs of gross abnormality.

Many of Howie's strenuously expressed objections to Broome's position have been referred to above. He has however many other criticisms many of which are valid, but some of which miss the mark entirely. For instance, in the latter connection Howie dismisses the possibility of an understanding of Ezekiel's behavior on the grounds that it is not possible to "psychoanalyze" a person who has been dead for 2500 years. He bases the amount of information needed for an accurate diagnosis of any person on the amount of time that the average

psychiatrist tries to gather enough information to offer a diagnosis. The result is that it appears that things are being said about Ezekiel based on sparce evidence that a psychiatrist would not say until he has accumulated a mass of information that it would never be possible to obtain from any historical person much less Ezekiel. This is an unwarranted comparison. For one thing an equal effort and amount of information is not needed to diagnose all cases. In many cases a single striking behavioral manifestation is sufficient. For instance a person in a catatonic stupor would not require the "complete case history of family and social background plus at least six face-to-face interviews before preliminary diagnosis can be made" (22, p. 74).

In almost every case where Ezekiel's behavior is questioned by Broome, Howie is content to accept without question the superficial and obvious explanation. Surely if modern psychology, particularly psychoanalysis, has taught us anything it is that superficial appearances can be deceptive. Thus for Howie fire cannot be a sexual symbol but only an explicit symbol of Yahweh, the rush of waters cannot symbolize with waters, but must indicate life-giving waters (is there fundamentally even a difference ?), a sword is a symbol of warfare not of castration, and digging under the wall by Ezekiel cannot have sexual implications (22, p. 84-87). This is not to agree with Broome's interpretations of these events, in fact, the present writer finds them to be as absurd as does Howie, but for different reasons. The significance of an act

is not always found in its rational appearance or explicit explanation. Thus Howie's criticisms do no harm to Broome's interpretations, because they entirely miss the point.

Howie insists that there is no suggestion that the eyes of the Merkabah vision are perceived by Ezekiel as persecutory, or that it is haunting or chasing him (22, p.85). Is this to say that Yahweh is not seeking out Ezekiel and that Ezekiel is not reluctant? If so then the whole event loses all meaningful significance. Howie is correct however in defending Ezekiel's sanity vis-a-vis hearing voices. This was certainly the most common means of deity communicating with humanity not only in ancient times but in a certain sense right up to the present day. It is probably the only way of communicating to another human being the experience of being "called" by God, or the "voice" of conscience as we would say.

Ezekiel's behavior, Howie feels can all be understood as a reaction, to the emotional stress that he and his fellow exiles wer experiencing to the catachysmic events that were transpiring, and to the religious and social milieu meeting with Ezekiel's sensitive and artistic temperament (22, p.90). Much of this is undoubtedly true, but surely there is evidence that Ezekiel's reaction to the situation places him very much apart and makes him therefore an appropriate target for psychological examination. So intent is Howie to remove all suspicion of blemish from Ezekiel that he even objects to Kittel's innocuous description of Ezekiel as torn between a "pedantic priestly soul given to details of law and liturgy, and the fire

of the prophet denouncing the people and promising divine destruction for their sins," because, says Howie, such a description implies a schizophrenic split in his personality (22, p.90). Aside from an incorrect use of the term schizophrenia by Howie, this seems to indicate a fear of any attempt to understand the prophet's personality for fear of revealing something not quite "normal" that might vitiate his message. Ezekiel had a tension between priest and prophet in his personality, admits Howie, but he insists that they seldom came in conflict (22, p.92). There is even, he asserts, a harmony between these two aspects of his personality. Rather, Howie preceeds, Ezekiel was a "daydreamer rather than a mystic" but "daydreamer is hardly a fitting description for this man ....he was a mystic by nature" (22, p.90). He deviated "considerably from the norm but was not truly a 'psychopath" (22, p.90). Howie seems to be so intent on defending Ezekiel's sanity that he has confused even himself.

Howie's approach to the study of Ezekiel's personality is completely negative. He objects to all efforts to examine his reported behavior in depth for fear of what it might uncover apparently, and in the end comes up with a superficial picture of Ezekiel as a visionary which no one could be bothered taking exception to. Broome's approach however is superficial, too, despite the illusion of depth that it might give due to the extravagant use of psychiatric terminology. He sheds no light whatever on the dynamics of Ezekiel's behavior, instead he merely deluges the reader with a barrage of jargon made more obscure than usual because it is given no meaning in terms of

Ezekiel as a person. Thus both approaches, the psychologism of Broome and the anti-psychological approach of Howie, are shown to be inadequate as a means to any serious understanding of Ezekiel or of the nature of prophecy. The remainder of this thesis will attempt to show that an understanding is possible that does not detract from the importance of his message.

CHAPTER VI

CRISIS IN RESPONSIBILITY

In seeking to understand the person and message of Ezekiel the temptation to resort to diagnostic labels will be avoided as much as possible. Indeed an existential phenomenological approach to personality disorder must by virtue of its understanding of man eschew all attempts, no matter how convenient to reduce human beings to nosological categories and psychiatric pigeon-holes. Once a person has been so reduced then all his behavior becomes colored by the label that has been attached to his personality. It is the contention of the present appraoch to the understanding of behavior that even bizarre and obviously psychotic behavior can be understood existentially and phenomenologically, that is from within the person's world as his attempt to come to terms with the world as it presents itself to him. The world comes to the psychotic as an overwhelmingly terrifying and debilitating place from which he must flee. He seeks measures and defences that will ameliorate the threat that seems to engulf him. Within the victim's confrontation with complete nothingness he seeks with whatever resources he can muster to establish a new ground even if he must create something where there is nothing. Under the threat confronting him and his frantic struggle to escape his reactions clouded by his distorted perception of the world may not be a coherent one, except in true paranoia, but it is all he can do and he must be understood

in the light of what he is seeking to accomplish.

It is difficult to say what will come of diagnostic labels even if behavior is understood existentially rather than medically and pathologically. Of course certain rather stereotyped reactions to stress do occur and they lend themselves to categorization despite the best will and realization of their inadequacy. So even if they were dispensed with a new set of categories would likely develop to take their place, for the human mind must classify so that it can lend order to the world.

In dealing with Ezekiel we are presented with considerable behavior which we shall see resembles nothing so much as catatonic schizophrenia and this will be pointed out. However this will always be done in the light of the interpretation of how Ezekiel is seeking phenomenologically to cope with what has thrust itself into his world.

As Ezekiel dwelt among the exiles along the Canal Chebar he pondered the reasons for the staggering misfortunes that had befallen his people, as indeed all sensitive Israelites must have done. But Ezekiel was a priest (1:3) who by virtue of his vocation therefore was responsible for the relationship between his people and Yahweh, responsible especially for removing all obstacles to the fulfilment of that relationship. He was not very many years after the full expression of the doctrine of divine retribution as expounded in the Deuteronomic code Ezekiel found himself wrestling, as was all Israel undoubtedly, with understanding the ways of Yahweh with men.

His ways were not as obvious as they were thought to be. Simple external compliance to the cultic practices of Yahweh did not preserve Israel from the consequences of its action in the world. The Israelites too were a proud, even an arrogant people, long accustomed to regarding themselves as especially favored and Yahweh's Chosen People and therefore due to receive special treatment from the hands of Yahweh. Yet they had never really seen any signs of special treatment, not at any rate like their haloed memories of the golden era of David's empire. They consoled themselves by looking for a day when t ey would be vindicated. Instead of vindication however they encountered defeat. Always they had been able to hold out hope that no matter how bad things became they still possessed the land, "The Promised Land." This was their voucher, their guarantee of the great things that had been promised them. After all it was from the most dismal beginnings as slaves in Egypt that they had been delivered and had risen to worldly power under David. Now however they had suffered the final irrevocable humiliation. Even the land had been taken from them. They were back in Egypt in effect. What sense were they to make of the covenant relationship? What kind of God was Yahweh? A treacherous one or merely an impotent one?

Ezekiel must have felt an unusual responsibility to help his people in this worst disaster of all in their history. He had already come out of a very strong religious climate, especially amongst the nation's leadership. Either he was himself thirty years of age when he received his call

to prophesy (1:1) or else this figure refers to the thirtieth year since the Josianic reform or even to the thirtieth year after Ezekiel's call. Both explanations are feasible and both may shed light on his attitude toward the events of Israel's immediate past. In the former case, as the son of a priest (1:3), he would have grown to manhood amidst the religious preoccupations of the priestly caste during the changes in the cult brought on by the Josianic reform. Thus he would have been molded in an intensely religious atmosphere, and probably one especially concerned with the ways of God's dealings with men in the light of the breakdown of the Deuteronomic explanation of divine retribution. If the 'thirtieth year' refers directly to the Josianic reform this would also tend to indicate an intense involvement with the reform, so much so that all subsequent Israelite history was dated for him with reference to it. In either case therefore Ezekiel was doubtlessly extraordinarly preoccupied with seeking explanations for Israel's fate.

As Ezekiel pondered the problem in a state of acute distress over, not only the plight but over what he could say and do about it, the answer disclosed itself to him through overwhelming "visions of God." It is not necessary to question the sanity of a person merely because he experienced revelation in terms of a vision. Modern man is not given to expecting truth to come to him by such picturesque means because he relies so much on conceptualization as the means of grasping truth. However even modern man experiences visions in the form of dreams, when he releases control over his consciousness

in sleep. Dreams have not been regarded as avenues for the realization of truth, at least not until Freud and psychoanalysis reopened them as meaningful phenomena. Characteristically Freud saw dreams only as indications of repressed wishes striving for expression. However such men as Jung and Fromm see dreams as equally important avenues for the expression of growth and new understanding of the direction in which one's life is moving. Furthermore drugs such as LSD appear to enable excessively rational modern man to be released from his conscious inhibitions so that he is able to experience overpowering visions, in the waking state.

Ancient man, especially in a culture like Israel's, would have no such inhibitions and would be quite receptive to the experience of a truth so overpowering that it could never hope to be merely conceptualized (the Hebrews were not a conceptualizing people anyway but very concrete in their language). Thus the advent of a revelation from the divine source, a numinous experience could not but take sensory form. For most of the prophets most of the time the disclosure of divine truth was received by the ear, by the Word of Yahweh, for the Israelites had long been a people of the ear (cf. Muilenburg) probably due to the prohibition against the creation of images of Yahweh. Ezekiel may have been that rarity in Israel, a visionary, that is one who received the numinous through the eye as well as the ear. This tendency may have been stimulated by his Babylonian environment where visual stimuli were more important than merely the auditory. There had been prophets

in Israel who saw visions instead of merely hearing words. Michaiah ben Imlah (1 Kings 22:19) saw the heavenly court, as did Isaiah of Jerusalem (Is. 6) and Jeremiah had visions (Jer. 4:23-26) so there were precedents for the reception of the divine message as a vision.

The impact with which Ezekiel received the visions of God suggests an overwhelming experience which literally prostrated him (1:28). Such is the nature of the experience of the holy, the mysterium tremendum et fascinosum to which Otto recalls us in the modern age.

Thus in the intensity of his questioning and his distress Ezekiel perceived probably in the ominous darkness and menacing thunder and lightning of a severe electrical storm (1:4) the answer that he inwardly knew coming to him as a call to prophesy from Yahweh himself. That the vision of Yahweh comes to Ezekiel through such an ominous medium strongly suggests that he already knew the nature of what he would be called to do, but sought to suppress it from his awareness. Its threatening aspect suggests that Ezekiel is experiencing what we might call the voice of conscience, the call of authentic Being to Ezekiel to be himself, to open himself to the highest truth that he saw. In Israelite society this could only be understood as a call from Yahweh to use and speak his message to the apostate people of Israel. This is in no way to reduce the call of Yahweh to the merely human mechanism of conscience. It is to go in the direction of Heidegger and say that conscience is the call to authentic Being, calling Dasein to disclose the fullness of Being.

Thus conscience is a transcendent quality in man that urges him to his responsibilities in the world. Man is the shepherd of Being by his nature as man. To be man therefore he must be responsible to disclose Being wherever he finds himself. Neither however is this to say that Yahweh or God is to be equated with all that is. It is merely to show a connection between religious language of God and ontological language and how both seek to inform us of the way ultimate truth comes to man.

For modern man, and probably even for religious modern man, it has become largely impossible to conceive of God speaking to man in the way that this could be understood in prescientific times. It is therefore necessary to describe what happens when God does speak to man. It would seem that the existential phenomenological method of Heidegger is singularly helpful for this purpose, in spite of the fact that Heidegger remains entirely neutral vis-a-vis God. Nonetheless Heidegger comes remarkably close to a description of reality and the discovery of truth that coincides with the Judeo-Christian emphasis on revelation as the source of truth. In effect Heidegger says that truth is disclosed sola gratia, it cannot be forced out of its hiddenness in Being. Protestant Christianity says that the power to obey God comes sola gratia and cannot be forced out by man. We do not need to know God in his aseity that is as he is in himself, but we do need to rediscover how he makes himself known to men in events. Here is where Heidegger is helpful.

It has already been mentioned that Carl Jung sees in the prevalence of fours in Ezekiel's vision (1:5-6) (17,7:16) evidence of a mandala vision, which in his experience always points to the onset of self-fulfilment or individuation. Jung's view makes the vision fully coincident with an existential interpretation where the call of conscience signals the immediate potentiality of becoming an authentic self. It also coincides with Anton Boisen's view (5) that the crisis of the catatonic experience is the call to become committed to responsible activity as directed by the conscience.

What Ezekiel has known comes to him fully disclosed as his responsibility to proclaim. Israel has suffered divine punishment for its apostasy and will suffer much more. Ezekiel has lived in the midst of Israel's apostasy. He has, as we have seen, either grown to manhood or lived his manhood in the spiritual fall from the exalted expectations of the Josianic reform. He now sees that fall into apostasy as the occasion for Yahweh's punishment. Someone must now assume the mantle of the prophet and preach the unenviable message of doom, lamentation and woe. Who better than Ezekiel? Because he is acutely aware of the message that must be preached, and because of his strong sense of personal responsibility, which breaks into full expression in chapters three, fourteen, eighteen, and thirty-three he knows as he has inwardly known that he must be the one to speak. Certainly his fellow Israelites are unaware, and they are bewildered and resentful. There is no Jeremiah here fearless enough to speak out and so

the responsibility is his alone. Ezekiel is, not surprisingly, terrified of this responsibility however and has as we have noted tried mightily to suppress it from his awareness. The Merkabah however signals that if he is to be responsible, if he is to be true to himself he must disclose what he knows to be the truth of Yahweh's ways with Israel.

Ezekiel is not the first of the prophets or of any man, to express great reluctance to heed the call of Yahweh. It was certainly true of Moses (Ex. 3:11, 4:1,10-17) the prototype of all the prophets and it was true of Jeremiah (Jer. 1;6) perhaps the greatest of the prophets. They were aware of the task to be done, and of their responsibility toward the task. Aside from an understandable reluctance to face inevitable opposition it must be understood that these men were members of a society which still stressed the importance of the corporate body rather than that of individual expression. It is characteristic of members of such societies to be only too happy to cast all responsibility on the collective body to avoid the pain of such an unusual phenomenon as 'standing out' as an individual. It is true, as we shall later see, that Israel's nomadic tradition was much more conducive to such 'standing out' than were the nations that surrounded her. In fact the institution of prophecy which had had a long history in and among the Israelites was ready -made for such standing out. Even so it is always difficult to stand alone, but it is doubly so in a society where the overwhelming majority are afforded the safety of anonymity.

Only the brave few could ever be disposed to assume the unenviable task of opposing the entire society, so that only those who were seized by the power of Yahweh, who were constrained and who therefore could do no other than prophesy: "Yahweh has spoken, who can but prophesy," (Amos 3:8). Thus even though the institution of prophesy existed in Israel it was not an institution that one chose, and so it was understood. It was understood because it required more than human strength to oppose the society on behalf of Yahweh, so it was filled only by those who were called by Yahweh, those who in spite of themselves were responsible enough to answer. There were cultic prophets, but they lacked the courage of the solitary prophet, for they only spoke in groups under mutual influence and protection. The authentic prophets of Israel were probably among the first men in human history to dare to stand out and obey the call to be, to be shepherds of Being, spokesmen for God. These lone individuals are the great forerunners of what is today one of the most cherished and exalted of human values.

Returning directly to Ezekiel then, the ethos of his society would for the most part protect him from the call to responsible personal action. It was still safe therefore for him to thrust the call aside and remain an acceptable Israelite. But individual responsibility had been implicit, it would seem from the beginnings of the Covenenant community of Israel, in the history of the divine call to its heroes to perform deeds calling for lonely initiative at the bequest of Yahweh. This emphasis began in legend with Noah, went to the

Patriarchs, then to Joseph, Moses, the charismatic men of Judges, Saul, David and completing itself in the tradition of the prophets. Thus the sense of individual responsibility was an ever-present and ever-growing realization which the sensitive, creative and discerning personality could not avoid and remain true to himself as a son of Israel and a servant of Yahweh.

Ezekiel thus was thrown into desperate conflict between the call to authentic selfhood or self-fulfilment in responsible action, and the temptation to remain submerged in the safety and anonymity of the world of the "they" as Heidegger calls it. The attempt to confine his existence to the latter mode failed. However it may be asked: "What evidence is there that Ezekiel was reluctant to obey, he makes no explicit protests as did Moses and Jeremiah?" The answer to this is seen in his reaction of complete bitterness and devastation after the vision leaves him (3: 14-15).

Conscience reminds man of his task whenever he does not fulfil it. "This call of conscience," says Boss, "these feelings of guilt will not give him any peace until he has borne out all his possibilities in caring for the things and fellow man of his world"(8, p.48). Man is always in debt or guilt (the words mean the same in German). He is responsible for carrying out his world-disclosing possibilities for living. Boss continues:

> All actual concrete feelings of guilt and pangs of conscience are grounded in this existential "being-in-debt" toward its whole existence, lasting all through life, no matter how grotesquely they may sometimes appear, and how far from their source they may have been driven in various neurotic conditions (8, p.48).

Thus to be man is to be responsible for what one perceives. Ezekiel saw the condition of Israel and he saw its meaning. He tried to keep it from his awareness, from the realm of his personal responsibility but the 'call to be' was too persistent and too loud. Because he was not fulfilling his potentialities he experienced guilt. He came therefore to fear everything potentially threatening as the call to responsibility. It would not be surprising then that to his distressed and guilt-ridden mind the strong wind, ominous black clouds, darkness, and threatening thunder and lightning would be seen to contain Yahweh calling him to remind him of what he had so desperately sought to suppress. It is probably not inaccurate to say that the ingredients of the vision, the strange creatures, the burning coals of fire flashing with lightning, the living creatures darting like lightning, the wheels filled with eyes (1:6,14-18), were perceived as threatening and terrifying to Ezekiel. The wheels filled with eyes in particular would seem to reflect feelings of guilt for unfulfilled responsibility on the part of Ezekiel.

The threatening nature of the entire experience seems even more plausible in the light of the message that Yahweh had for Ezekiel. It was a message not only of doom and woe (2:10) common to most of the messages of the great prophets, but it was compounded by a terrifying reminder of

of personal responsibility for the message on Ezekiel's part, unprecedented in the entire canon of Israelite prophecy:

> "Son of man, I have made you a watchman for the house of Israel; whenever you hear a word from my mouth, you shall give them warning from me. If I say to the wicked, 'You shall surely die,' and you give him no warning, nor speak to warn the wicked from his wicked way, in order to save his life, that wicked man shall die in his iniquity; but his blood I will require at your hand. But if you warn the wicked, and he does not turn from his wickedness or from his wicked way, he shall die in his iniquity; but you will have saved your life. Again if a righteous man turns from his righteousness and commits iniquity, and I lay a stumbling block before him, he shall die; because you have not warned him, he shall die for his sin, and his righteous deeds which he has done shall not be remembered; but his blood I will require at your hand. Nevertheless if you warn the righteous man not to sin, and he does not sin, he shall surely live, because he took warning; and you will have saved your life." (3:17-21)

For no prophet was the message he was called to proclaim accompanied by such a stunning and almost threatening quality. For if Ezekiel did not preach the terrible prophecy of doom he would be held personally accountable for the fate of Israel. Jeremiah felt responsibility for the fate of Israel too but Ezekiel was so overwhelmed that he fell into what must have been akin to a catatonic stupor for seven days upon being presented with his forceful call to responsibility (3:15). Consequent to the ponderings in which he was undoubtedly thrown during this period of apparent paralysis, the word of Yahweh came again to him. It was during this second visitation that Ezekiel received the above reminder that he was to be held personally responsible for the fate of Israel if he did not proclaim the message.

This would seem to indicate that, during his ponderings on the banks of the Chebiar, Ezekiel was still unprepared to proclaim the message or at least was looking for a way out of the responsibility. Only some kind of vacillation on Ezekiel's part would explain the terrifying forcefulness of the message which came the second time. Ezekiel was even more distressed by the second message as might well be expected. He withdrew to his house in a state of what Lindblom probably correctly calls hysterical aphasia or muteness together with the hallucination that he is bound with cords so that he is helpless (3:24-26).

It would thus appear that Ezekiel's fear so far still has held the day. If he is speechless and paralyzed then surely he cannot be expected to assume the awesome responsibilities to which he is called. Rather than standing on and assuming responsibility he has withdrawn into the stuporous state of impotence where nothing can be expected of him. In this sense his behavior is indisputebly akin to catatonia.

After the first vision Ezekiel apparently has chosen inactivity. He is afraid to act, to stand out. He has lived through the last thirty years of crisis in the kingdom of Judah and has undoubtedly had occasion to observe the unhappy fate of Jeremiah. In fact a case could probably be established that would demonstrate a strong link between the message and consequent experiences of Jeremiah, and the severe conflict

which Ezekiel experienced between the call to prophesy and the terror of facing his fellow Israelites with the message of doom and judgment. There is no way of showing any relationship of a personal nature, not even acquaintanceship between these two great prophets. However it seems very possible that Ezekiel's emphasis on individual responsibility was a direct outgrowth of Jeremiah's ministry. Jeremiah felt an overwhelming sense of responsibility for Israel. Ezekiel's overwhelming conviction that the nature of prophesy entails personal responsibility for the fate of Israel following immediately upon Jeremiah's ministry which demonstrated this seems strong evidence of a relationship. It is not improbable in fact that Ezekiel was a disciple of Jeremiah. The kingdom of Judah was apparently caught up in an obstinate nationalism. She regarded it as certain of final delivery by Yahweh's hand even as Jerusalem had been delivered from Sennacherib in 701. The opposition to Jeremiah in this climate of self-assurance was overwhelming as the book of Jeremiah amply demonstrates. His activity is regarded by most as blatant treason. Thus his followers, those who saw the situation as he did with Judah under the judgment of Yahweh were probably very few in number. It appears that Ezekiel was one of that few for he has a profound understanding of the fate of the exiles as Yahweh's judgment. He is also very much aware of, and concerned about, Israel's obstinacy, the very characteristic that so troubled Jeremiah. Ezekiel's message of lamentation, mourning and woe is a direct continuation of Jeremiah's prophecies. His overwhelming

conviction too that the root of Israel's national troubles is to be found in the individual heart is very much in Jeremiah's tradition. Like Jeremiah Ezekiel sees the answer to Israel's apostasy to be in the gift of a new spirit so that they may serve Yahweh freely and gratefully;

Ezekiel	Jeremiah
Therefore say, 'Thus says Yahweh God: Though I remove them far off among the nations, and though I scattered them among the countries where they have gone.' Therefore say 'Thus says Yahweh God: I will gather you from the peoples and assemble you out of the countries where you have been scattered, and I will give you the land of Israel.' And when they come there, they will remove from it all its detestable things and all its abominations. And I will give them one heart of flesh that they may walk in my statutes and keep my ordinances and obey them; and they shall be my people and I will be their God (11:16-20)	Behold I will gather them from all the countries to which I drove them in my anger and my wrath and in great indignation; I will bring them back to this place, and I will make them dwell in safety. And they shall be my people and I will be their God. I will give them one heart and one way that they may fear me forever for their own good and the good of their children after them. I will make with them an everlasting covenant that I will not turn away from doing good to them; and I will put the fear of me in their hearts that they may not turn from me. I will plant them in this land in faithfulness with all my heart and soul. (Jer. 32:27-41)

Jeremiah also anticipates Ezekiel's emphasis on individual responsibility, though with Jeremiah it is more like an eschatalogical hope: In those days they shall no longer say: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." But everyone shall die for his own sin; each man who eats sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge. (Jer. 31:29-30). What Jeremiah sees as a future hope Ezekiel sees a present reality, and this is to become later a major plank of his message.

It may be wondered: what does a connection between Jeremiah and Ezekiel have to do with the understanding of Ezekiel's fears? Though he may have been a sympathizer, even a disciple of Jeremiah, Ezekiel was probably much chastened by the unfortunate consequences to Jeremiah of his uncompromising prophecies. Thus he is now terror-struck at the thought of assuming his master's mantle and preaching the same grim and unpopular message of mourning, lamentation and woe. The extent of Ezekiel's fear of the people is evidenced by the constant encouragement for him not to be afraid that is repeated in Yahweh's words to Ezekiel in the first address:

> And when they hear or refuse to hear (for they are a rebellious house) they will know that there has been a prophet among them. And you, son of man, be not afraid of them, nor be afraid of their words, though briers and thorns are with you and you sit upon scorpions; be not afraid of their words nor be dismayed at their looks for they are a rebellious house. And you shall speak my words to them, whether they hear or refuse to hear; for they are a rebellious house. (2:5-7)

But the call to prophesy is upon his however. He has been called to be himself, to open himself to the truth as he knows it to be. He is in an even worse conflict because he ate the scroll upon which were written the words of lamentation and mourning and woe (2:8-10), indicating that the message is an inextricable part of him. He has no choice but to prophesy. Torn between the terror of the fate of the prophet and the terror of what happens if he disobeys the call Ezekiel is reduced to prostration as he sits among the exiles on the banks of the river Chebar (3:15). This stupor not only

resembles a catatonic attack but the event that has reduced him to such inactivity is fully consistent with what often leads to catatonic schizophrenia. The victim faces a crisis in responsibility. If he wills to act he is liable to be punished and if he wills not to act he is held responsible and liable to punishment. In the former case it is by the people and in the latter by Yahweh. At this point the pressures on him seem to balance one another.

It is not the intention of this present study to attach a diagnostic label and rest satisfied that Ezekiel's behavior has been accounted for. The entire direction of this study has been diametrically opposed to such methods of understanding human behavior. What is being attempted is to show the agonizing dimensions of the conflict that produced in the prophet Ezekiel the strange behavior reported of him especially in the early sections of the book that bears his name. In Daseinsanalytic terms Ezekiel is called by conscience to authentic selfhood, to disclose truth as he perceived it, but he is also immersed in the conventional world of the "they" and its pressures weigh him down in terror for the feared consequences of standing out. Call it catatonic schizophrenia if you like but it is a very real human problem, one which all who take the religious imperative seriously confront when it conflicts with conventionality. Ezekiel's behavior has not been reduced, it has been understood on its own level as it presents itself.

The word of Yahweh comes to him again, the call of conscience to authentic Being urges itself upon him. This time as has been previously seen the message is of such force as to be threatening. If he does not act he is to be held responsible for the fate of his people. This coincides precisely with the Daseinsanalytic description of the responsibility of Dasein for all within its world of influence. Now a greater imperative than ever lies on Ezekiel. Something must be done one way or another. But Ezekiel is still frightened about the prospect of standing over against his resentful fellow Israelites. The deadlock that keeps Ezekiel rigidly inactive is broken however. In his state of rigid immobility he can will nothing in either direction. If he decides for his safety in the "they" he is subject to Yahweh's wrath, and if he decides to prophesy the word of Yahweh he is subject to the people's resentment. In this sense as mentioned above Ezekiel exhibits behavior that is consistent with that of catatonic schizophrenia.

If he is made speechless and rendered physically helpless by being bound he will be literally "unable to reprove them." This solution is made even more satisfying because it comes to him as a word from Yahweh who himself binds Ezekiel and cleaves his tongue to the roof of his mouth. The word from Yahweh here appears to be less Yahweh's word than Ezekiel's rationalization. He will speak but only when Yahweh has opened his mouth (3:27). Thus Ezekiel is divested of all responsibility. On the one hand he sees himself prevented by Yahweh from speaking and acting so he appeases his fear of the Israelites, and on the other hand he will speak only

when Yahweh opens his mouth, thus appeasing his conscience which comes to him as Yahweh.

Yet apparently the call to authenticity does not let up even in the face of Ezekiel's rationalizing tour de force. A further compromise must be sought between his anxiety which renders him helpless and dumb, and his sense of responsibility which urges him to warn Israel. He resorts to symbolic actions, which once again give him the best of both worlds. The word of Yahweh, or the call to authentic Being urges him to build a replica of the beseiged Jerusalem (4:1-3), which warns the exiles that even worse things are to come. Even Jerusalem is about to fall, for it is not yet 586 but 592. Following this command comes the bizarre command for him to lie upon his left side for 390 days to symbolize the years of Israel's punishment, (the exact significance of this number of years is unknown) (4:5). Then he is to turn to his left side forty days to symbolize the years of Judah's punishment (4:6) (similar to Jeremiah's prediction of seventy years of punishment (Jer. 25:11-12). During this time he is to set his face to Jerusalem with his arm bared thus prophesying against the city (4:7). He is then commended to take a sword to his hair and divide it into three parts, signifying the fate of the citizens of Jerusalem, a third to be burned in the destruction of Jerusalem, a third to face the sword, and a third to be scattered abroad (5:1 ff.). He is then to bake cakes made from a strange recipe using, among other ingredients, human dung, to symbolize the unhappy and unclean state of

exiled Israel unable to adhere to the laws of the cultus. Because of Ezekiel's scruples he can eat on cow dung, however, which is allowed to replace the human excrement once he has communicated the message of woe (4:9-16).

All of these symbolic acts testify to a terribly distressed soul. Resorting to symbolic acts is not by any means necessarily symptomatic of psychopathology. It is in fact quite common, almost a sine qua non of the true prophets. They normally resort to symbolic actions to dramatize their message to the people. Hosea remarried his wife though in the meantime she had become a harlot, to symbolize Yahweh's faithful love for Israel. Isaiah walked about the streets of Jerusalem in the nude symbolizing its fate (Is.20:2). Jeremiah walked hundreds of miles to bury his waist-cloth and retrieve it in a rotting state to symbolize the exile (Jer. 13:1-11). Thus it would not do to draw conclusions about Ezekiel's symbolic actions apart from the clear understanding that by themselves they tell us only that he is within the prophet tradition. At this point the only thing that can be said is that no other prophet has such a propensity for such acts.

With all of this said however it still remains to examine Ezekiel's symbolic actions within the context of the crisis under which he seems to be acting. All of the other prophets who resort to symbolic acts do it within the context of a public ministry. Ezekiel has yet to assume the mantle of the prophet publicly, and he does not appear to be

interpreting his actions as yet. This is unlike most of the prophetic acts. Furthermore though the other prophets' acts seem somewhat strange to us their actions are not nly acceptable for the prophet in Israelite society but they appear to be even rational disclosures which improve on words. At least at this stage, Ezekiel's actions deteriorate in their disclosing power and seem to obscure this message.

The fact too that they follow immediately upon his crisis in responsibility where he is resisting his call indicates that they are further indications of his conflict. The actions by any standards are bizarre, not merely however because twentieth century man finds them confusing, but because they require an unusual physical and emotional state to be carried out. So incredible is the picture of anyone lying on one side for 390 days then on the other forty days that most scholars dismiss its performance as unlikely. However because Ezekiel has already exhibited behavior that resembles catatonic schizophrenia his act of lying on his side must be taken more seriously than it otherwise would. Ezekiel has already shown a propensity for incredible periods of immobility. The catatonic schizophrenia characteristically is able to maintain himself in an immobile state for periods that the normal person would find to be physically impossible. It may be legitimate to qualify the periods of time during which Ezekiel is stated to have been on his side particularly because the figure 390 is so inexplicable. The problem that reduces the catatonic person to immobility is the terror of accepting responsibility for a decision as has been seen. It is also, as has been seen the

reason for Ezekiel's immobility. In the present situation Ezekiel is again seeking a compromise solution in the face of his fears. He fears to speak out to the people, yet he cannot disobey Yahweh. The compromise is obvious: symbolic actions. In symbolic actions Ezekiel sees a way of fulfilling his responsibilities while avoiding the risk in so doing. He is giving warning as he feels compelled to do but he is still avoiding what he fears will be the consequence for proclaiming such an unpopular message. In Freudian terminology it might be said that Ezekiel is answering the demands of the superego on terms that will preserve the ego. The people of Israel have been warned, their response is now their problem and no longer his responsibility, while he remains safely preserved. It is a tour de force that should undoubtedly be described as psychotic but for his purposes at least, it appears to be successful. From today's vantage point it cannot be known how communicable Ezekiel's symbolic warnings were. At any rate they do appear to have been undertaken with the intention of communicating to his fellow Israelites. If so this would obviate an interpretation of his behavior as simply psychotic. Yet the very bizarre forms that he used to symbolize his message are as noted, only understandable, if the account is to be taken at all seriously, as possible only for a person in a severe state of disturbance. This would seem to show the folly of rigid classifications even between pure psychosis and neurosis. For as bizarre as Ezekiel's behavior appears, even considering

the historical and social context, it is still an expression of human activity. Ezekiel remains a meaning-seeking, meaning-disclosing being who is actively seeking to come to terms as best he can with what is expected of him in terms of the person he is. He is not merely a catatonic schizophrenic. Nor is he someone who has disintegrated before unmanageable chaos. He is a man who has been called to prophesy, and therefore must do something yet who is terrified of its consequences to him, therefore is limited in what he dares to do.

The full extent of Ezekiel's fear of the prophetic role is made more evident when it is considered what a lofty vision he has of Yahweh. The strong emphasis on the glory of Yahweh is apparent throughout the entire book. Indeed it is the <u>sine qua non</u> of Ezekiel. The theme "And you (they) shall know that I am Yahweh" drums through Ezekiel's prophesy as though it were the theme of the book. Ezekiel's unique vision of the <u>Merkabah</u> in fact is characterized by a loftiness and wholly otherness beside which even Isaiah of Jerusalem's exalted view of Yahweh almost fades. The <u>Merkabah</u> is probably the most unanthropomorphic view of Yahweh throughout the whole Bible which is itself a book that seeks to eschew anthropomorphism. Ezekiel's strong emphasis on the glory of Yahweh has often been attributed to the fact that Ezekiel is a priest, whose role is so to emphasize Yahweh. At any rate we are shown by the prophet's high conception of Yahweh just how severe his terror and his reluctance must have been for Ezekiel to be so reluctant to obey the call to prophesy.

Perhaps a glimpse is given of why Ezekiel is so reluctant to prophesy in chapters six and seven. It is in these two chapters that we see the nature of the message that Ezekiel is called to preach. It is a message of unrelieved judgment and doom of which the description of "lamentation, mourning and woe" (2:10) is by no means an exaggeration. Yahweh will leave some alive, when he ends the destruction of Israel, but only in order to testify that he is Yahweh (6:8-10). Death shall be by sword, famine and pestilence (6:11-12). The land of Israel will be made desolate and waste with slain bodies lying everywhere (6:13-14).

In the seventh chapter the message of doom is even more forbidding if possible:

> "Thus says Yahweh God: Disaster after disaster! Behold it comes. An end has come, the end has come; it has awakened against you. Behold it comes. Your doom has come to you....Now I will pour out my wrath upon you, and spend my anger against you, and judge you according to your ways; I will punish you for all your abominations. And my eye will not spare, nor will I have pity; I will punish you according to your ways while your abominations are in your midst. Thus you will know that I am Yahweh who smite." (7:5-9)

Is it any wonder that Ezekiel was reluctant to preach such a message of doom and punishment? Undoubtedly it would not be received with very much enthusiasm by the "rebellious house" who so persecuted Jeremiah. There is no evidence that the words of chapters six and seven were preached. In fact if Ezekiel was mute at this time they obviously could not have been. The words appear moreover to Ezekiel, thus reinforcing the impression that they confront Ezekiel with

the message that he has known must be preached. The message is not a new one. It has been preached by all the great prophets. Since the time of Amos the prophets have spoken of the day of Yahweh in terms of doom and judgment. Furthermore the message is particularly similar to the thrust of Jeremiah's prophecies: "For thus says Yahweh: Do not enter the house of mourning or go to lament or bemoan them; for I have taken my peace from this people, says Yahweh, my steadfast love and mercy." (Jer. 16:5) The essential similarity, even identity of the prophetic messages especially to one who has probably acquainted with if not a disciple of Jeremiah would tend to confirm the suggestion earlier made that Ezekiel's call was no 'sudden rendering of the veil' but that it came as the climax to a long period of distressful pondering along with his conflicting fear which told him perhaps all the reasons why he should be responsible for proclaiming the message which he might well have seen as the continuation of the voice of the prophet to the exiles in Babylon now that Jeremiah is not here. Suddenly however the full pressure of what he has been seeking to hide from bursts upon him as the visions of Yahweh, the call of conscience to authentic Being.

No chronology is given for chapters six and seven. Because however there is no explicit command to preach, it is merely an instruction to Ezekiel of the nature of his ministry, it is probably safe to assume that this particular message does fit into the overall problem that appears to be dogging Ezekiel and therefore legitimately occurs near the beginning of his ministry and follows upon the symbolic actions.

About a year later one of the most unusual experiences of all those that occured to him befalls Ezekiel, one that arouses as much comment as the original visions and the prophet's distraught behavior. He received another visitation from the Merkabah vision and Ezekiel feels himself grapsed by the hair and carried "in visions of God to Jerusalem" (8:3). The phrase 'visions of God' suggests that Ezekiel recognized this experience as a visionary one and not his actual presence in Jerusalem; he has been assisted there by the Spirit. There have been many attempts to understand Ezekiel's experience of the apparent journey to Jerusalem and his witnessing of the temple abominations, slaughter of the wicked, and departure of the glory of Yahweh from the temple (10: 1-22,22-23). The main solutions that have been advocated are as follows: (1) evidence of a Palestinian ministry, (2) a partial Palestinian ministry, (3) descriptions on the basis of reports from Palestine to Ezekiel and the exiles in Babylon, (4) clairvoyance, and (5) a vision based on Ezekiel's preoccupation both with his own memories of temple desecration, and reports from Jerusalem compounded by his own prophetic apprehension of their due consequences.

If a Palestinian ministry is advocated at all then what Ezekiel reports having seen poses no problem at all. The only problem would be why he put it in the context of a vision and miraculous transportation from Babylon to Jerusalem. It would testify perhaps to an excessive tendency to dramatize,

or else to a fugue state in which he went to Palestine, returned and only remembered it as a visionary experience. Clairvoyance has already been eliminated from consideration because it is an uneconomic solution, whether or not extra-sensory perception is, or is not, a valid phenomenon.

It would seem to the writer that Ezekiel's experience of the vision of Jerusalem can be explained very well within the framework of the present study: Ezekiel's crisis in responsibility, in which case the latter of the five solutions would fit. Still overwhelmed by the problem at hand, and as far as is known, still unable, and therefore unwilling to act, Ezekiel once again receives the call to authentic Being, the call of conscience. It comes to him in what might be described as a catatonic trance. He experiences a vision of the terrible apostasy that is taking place in Jerusalem. Every conceivable idolatry is being practised in total defiance of Yahweh.

The image of jealousy (v. 5) probably refers to the image of Tammuz, since it is at the northgate that the women traditionally weep for Tammuz. The absence of any image on the seat suggests the absence of the deity for whom the women were weeping, further indication that the dying-rising god cult was desecrating the temple of Yahweh. These men were also mourning the dying (setting) of Tammuz (the sun). The portrayal of animal and serpentine figures suggests the celebration of Egyptian rites and that they take place under the ground suggests Egyptian rites of the dead. It may also refer to the Babylonian temples which Ezekiel saw in the Land

of Captivity. Possibly these images are suggested by Ezekiel's own reminiscences of idolatries practiced in his youth. Perhaps too as defeat loomed before Jerusalem they forsook Yahweh, or thought he forsook them (8:12) and decided they had best worship the successful gods of the successful conquering nation. Ezekiel's memories were probably compounded by reports from travellers between Palestine and Babylon. There is evidence in Jeremiah (c.29) that there was considerable travel between the two places. Kaufmann (27) who does not like the implication that Jerusalem had fallen into idolatry and the temple desecrated by Israelites asserts that Ezekiel is overwhelmed by childhood memories of the idolatrous abominations during the apostate reign of Manasseh, either actual memories or stories told in his priestly family. This seems plausible so far but when Kaufmann goes on to say that Ezekiel is so haunted by the horror of such desecration that he feels Yahweh must exact retribution he is probably letting his defense of Israel's honor outweigh the evidence at hand. The entire thrust of Ezekiel's message is that the exiles must stop blaming their fathers for their own fate. The past is over and done and Israel must repent <u>now</u> for its present sin. He is the prophet who despite the heavy judgment explicit in his message gives Israel the sense of responsibility to enable them to repent personally and not be held back in fatalism by the proverb: "Our fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge."

Doubtless however Ezekiel is brought back to childhood reminiscences or accounts or previous abominations, but being

very much a man of the present it is difficult to see him becoming aroused about the past. He is aroused because of what he hears by reports from Palestine about what is again occuring. But what is especially horrible to him about his vision is "seeing" the judges of Yahweh go forth into the city carrying out their task. Ezekiel is horrified: "And while they were smiting and I was left alone, I fell upon my face and cried, Ah Yahweh God! Wilt thou destroy all that remains of Israel in the outpouring of thy wrath upon Jerusalem"(9:8). Then Ezekiel sees what must make his priestly heart break in two: the vision of the Glory of Yahweh departing from the temple. Then in the final horror he is taken into the midst of the elders of Israel and commanded to prophesy. Apparently he does prophesy for the first recorded time in the book and while he is doing so Pelatiah son of Benaiah drops dead. Ezekiel is distraught again as one who fears what the effect of his prophesy might well be (11:13).

The sum of all of this seems to indicate that Ezekiel has reached another severe crisis in his call to prophesy. He has apparently done nothing, in spite of the fact that he has been told that he is totally responsible for the fate of Israel, that he is its watchman. As he contemplates what he is going to do the voice of conscience, the vision of Yahweh tells him in effect what is about to happen. Yahweh is about to act out his judgment upon apostate Israel. Ezekiel must act now before it is too late, as it soon will be. The executioners are being sent out. Even the elect of Israel

are being felled by Yahweh's word of judgment. What Ezekiel is responsible for is now taking place just as it was promised and even more so. We are led completely astray if we concern ourselves unduly about how Ezekiel witnessed these events and how Pelatiah died. The fact is, as Lindblom has pointed out, we do not know whether Pelatiah actually died at all. All we do know is that Ezekiel had a vision wherein all these terrible things were perceived to happen. They need not have happened at all. They may well be a product of Ezekiel's fantasies or even a dream, as a matter of fact, something as prosaic as a nightmare. In his state of acute distress which he does not appear to have come out of since the original call to prophesy Ezekiel frets increasingly about his situation, as people do who know that they must act yet cannot bring themselves to do so. The call to authenticity comes, as has been noted above, and, as Anton Boisen incidentally asserts, is the fundamental problem facing the catatonic person. He is in his apparent stupor facing the problem of the meaning of life and his responsibility within it. However what makes the entire experience so devastating to the person suffering from this affliction is that he feels that a great responsibility has been laid upon him and he has not acted on it. Such a person cannot act because of his fear of being held responsible for failure. Thus the feeling increases and he ponders how to find his way out of the abyss at the bottom of which he finds himself.

Ezekiel is in such a position. He feels responsible for the fate of Israel, yet he fears to act upon it because of his fear of the people after the way they treated Jeremiah,

the bearer of a similar message. He ponders on how to act, how to get out of his dilemna. Ezekiel has just come out of the period of his long symbolic representation of Israel's punishment. It is interesting to note at this time that this may provide a validation for the bizarre and seemingly impossible symbolic acts of chapter four. He has been commanded to lie on one side for 390 days, and on the other for forty days. This is a total of 430 days, approximately one year and three months (lunar year). The date given when Ezekiel receives the call of Yahweh in the first place is the fifth year, the fourth month, the fifty day of the month (1:1). When he is "taken up" to Jerusalem, no dates having been reported in the meantime it is the sixth year, sixth month, the fifth day of the month (8:1). The intervening time is almost exactly time enough for Ezekiel to have been occupied fretting about the original call (3:15) then, with apparently very little intervening time his call to perform the symbolic actions which would, as noted take some 430 days. Having performed these he now experiences being taken up to Jerusalem where he perceives the judgment of Yahweh beginning to be put into effect. The rather shaky compromise between apparently obeying Yahweh's command by demonstration, while he preserves himself by remaining silent and incidentally performing an act of such strangeness as perhaps not even to be understood by his fellow exiles must be succeeded by further action. He now receives a warning even more terrible than any previously. It now appears that Yahweh is beginning to act, and so must he before too late.

At this point a very interesting mitigating feature enters which seems to make the message that Ezekiel must preach easier. For the first time the message of doom is softened by a word of hope and redemption by Yahweh: "Thus says Yahweh God: 'I will gather you from the peoples, and assemble you out of the countries where you have been scattered, and I will give you the land of Israel.'" (11:17) There follows further words of comfort and promise. A ray of hope, seems to enter for Ezekiel. If he can end his fearful prophecies of doom and judgment with a call to repentance and hope then his fate at the hands of Israel might not be received with the anger that he anticipates. Hitherto as well the emphasis has been on Ezekiel's craven fear of the people. There is room here to emphasize another more attractive feature of Ezekiel's person. He is after all, a priest (1:3), whose function is to mediate between Yahweh and Israel. He cares for his people as well as fearing them and does not see himself as one to preach the wrath of Yahweh to them. Where he can preach the comfort and salvation of Yahweh he is more in his own element. Thus his earlier reluctance to obey fully the call to prophesy was perhaps not only due to his fear of the people. He probably felt very inadequate as well for the role as in fact did Jeremiah. In this connection therefore it is interesting to note that for the first time Ezekiel is reported as returning to the exiles and preaching to them: "And I told the exiles what Yahweh had showed me" (11:25). On one hand he has been frightened into obedience by his own strong sense of responsibility but even more compelling apparently he has

been shown a hopeful message for his priestly heart to preach.

Ezekiel is not usually thought of as possessing human warmth at all. He has seemed to be in fact probably the coldest and least sympathetic of all the prophets. But the evidence seems to be that when he received a message to preach that was compatible with his person his frozen tongue was loosened.

Ezekiel's fears and misgivings are not entirely resolved even at this point. He still prefers symbolic actions, as we see in the immediately subsequent chapters (12 & 13). However a different note has entered into the acts. For the first time they seem to follow in the tradition of prophetic actions. Not only are the actions quite unambiguous, totally lacking the almost obscene and pathological character of the first acts, but he is called upon to interpret his actions lest they not be understood (12:10). The first action in the new series is an imitation of the flight of Zedekiah by night symbolizing the total exile of Israel, while the second is of the plight of the exiles. Thus he has taken up the message albeit in a somewhat attenuated form. It is certainly acceptable for a prophet of Israel to act out parts of his message but in Ezekiel's case it might still indicate a lingering fear of speaking boldly and unambiguously. At any rate there is no real looking back henceforth. The elders of Israel are reported as coming to seek his counsel (14: 1ff) which would seem to indicate that he has begun to prophesy. He is furthermore

not attacked but heeded in spite of the boldness of his message. He even speaks to the elders in the most uncompromising manner of the prophetic tradition. It would appear that Ezekiel's victory over himself is won. There is no further indication whatever of hesitation. The mantle of the prophet is accepted. His message is a blend of direct oracles, allegories and symbolic action. He warns Israel of its need to repent or else to face even more grimly than at present the judgment of Yahweh. Yet there is also encouragement and hope in his message, assurances of Yahweh's continuing presence and providence ".....yet I will remember my covenant with you in the days of your youth and I will establish with you an ever -lasting covenant" (16:60). Thus Ezekiel obeys the call of responsibility, the call of Yahweh, the call to authentic Being, as a channel of the Word of Yahweh, as a shepherd of Being.

It would appear that Ezekiel has learned his lesson well. Though already a person with a strong sense of personal responsibility he tried mightily to remain submerged in anonymity though he knew himself to be called out. Out of the devastation of his own experience he discovered that personal responsibility was not something that could ever be evaded under any circumstances. It would press and call incessantly until obeyed. This probably enabled Ezekiel to realize very forcibly the importance of awakening the exiles to their personal responsibility for where they found themselves. He attacks the debilitating consequences of the proverb: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes.....". It is no more to be used

comes the word of Yahweh. Thus Ezekiel, with the thoroughness of the legalistic mentality spells out all the possible implications of each person's responsibility for his own sin (18:1 ff). Each person is responsible for his own sins, and not those of his fathers or of his sons:

> "The soul that sins shall die. The son shall not suffer for the iniquity of the father, nor the father for the iniquity of the son, the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon himself, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon himself. (18:20)

Even if a man does sin but turns away from his sin he shall live, for he has <u>decided</u> to repudiate sin. However should a man live righteously and then <u>decide</u> for sin then his individual decision will be the measure of him, and not a balance sheet of his deeds. Thus the responsibility of the individual for his person is the crucial standard for Ezekiel.

This is no mere warning for Ezekiel; this is good news. Now they can escape the fatalistic resignation that arises from the feeling that they are being punished for their father's sins. Not only are they being punished for their own but if they repent it will be well for them. They can take their fate into their own hands. This is a new message for Israel and they seem to embrace it and learn from it. Ezekiel's voice is heard no more after 503. Ezekiel's message or predominant judgment is over, and now a person more eloquent who can inspire a larger vision of comfort and hope than could Ezekiel is called upon, the unknown prophet called Deutero-Isaiah. Far from enraging the exiles with his forbidding message Ezekiel appears to have been well-received by them, in fact

too well received. It is failing of humanity that all too often we come to enjoy a critical analysis of our failings, as long as it remains in the collective. Giving assent seems to appease our consciences. This seems to have been Ezekiel's fate, a far cry from that of Jeremiah, for it is said to him:

> "And lo, you are to them as one who sings love songs with a beautiful voice and plays well on an instrument, for they hear what you say, but they will not do it. When this comes...and come it will!.....then they will know that a prophet has been among them" (33:32)

Apparently Israel did come to do it and learn that a prophet had been among them. Not only do we have the suggestion that this is true in the appearance of Deutero-Isaiah, for in the providence of God prophets are called when the time is ripe, but there is internal indication of the success of Ezekiel's mission both personally and spiritually.

Ezekiel passed through the great crisis in responsibility which he faced and preached with great power and uncompromising vigor a message of repentance and acceptance of responsibility. He is able to end his prophecies with a purified vision. He is granted the vision of the return of the Glory of Yahweh to the restored, purified Jerusalem in which is located the new temple (40-43), the purified priesthood (44; 46:19-24) and the final culmination, the river of life (47: 1-12) which flows through the temple eastwards to freshen the waters of the Dead Sea, and nourish the trees on its banks. In the midst of the great vision of Jerusalem dwells the Merkabah, Yahweh himself (43: 1-2). Israel is given a new name "Yahweh shall be there."

Ezekiel has found himself, for only an authentic person can be a fulfilled shepherd of Yahweh, and he has been granted a sight of the accomplishment of his prophesy. We hear no more of Ezekiel, whether he was not granted the final return to Jerusalem, or whether his labors accomplished he was able to return in silence. However he left his mark on his faith for out of the renewed vision that he was granted he was able to forge the direction in which the faith was to take. Thus he earned the title "Grandfather of Judaism."

APPENDIX A

THE CRITICAL PROBLEM IN EZEKIEL

The book of Ezekiel is one which poses many problems for the textual critic. In the early years of Biblical criticism Ezekiel was left largely untouched. In fact it was regarded as being the one book that could largely be accepted as it was, and according to its stated dates 590-570 B.C. This peaceful state of affairs lasted until approximately World War I. At this time however Ezekiel was attacked with a vengeance outdoing even previous attacks on other books, as if to make up for lost time. It has been particularly subject to attack with regard to: (1) its unity, (2) the traditional dating, and (3) the setting of the prophet. There are however striking discrepancies amongst the critics. Nothing like a consensus has emerged. They have been united only in the vigor of their attacks.

The question is now therefore: what light if any does the present interpretation of Ezekiel shed upon various critical problems in the book, and perhaps even more basically, can the present findings be reconciled with what is understood or known about the book of Ezekiel?

Let us examine to see what clarification this study may lend to problems in the unity of the book of Ezekiel as well as what might be disclosed of the dating and locale of the writing. What consensus of scholarly opinion that there is about Ezekiel regarding its unity is that the book owes its present state to the fact that two different sets of narratives

and oracles have been combined into one book. As soon as serious critical work was commenced on Ezekiel critics began to see more than one hand at work. Holscher was the first to come out strongly for a double source or recension theory. It is inevitable that this would have been seen, and undeniable that it is so. There are probably more doublets in Ezekiel than in any other book in the Bible. It is bad enough that these make for a boring repetitiveness throughout much of the book, but it happens that the second source, or editor seems to have a very pedestrian mentality anyway which in effect compounds a felony in examining Ezekiel from a critical view -point. Only those parts of the text which have a bearing on the present thesis will be examined.

Many critics insist that the opening vision is a compound of a storm vision and the vision of a throne-chariot. However May (29) concludes after an examination of all those who put forth this view that the entire vision is of one piece. The first person and the third person reports in the opening verses (1: 1-3) suggest the hand of the editor in the third person report. In the second chapter where Ezekiel receives his commission May suggests that 2:1-3a, 8b ff, belong to Ezekiel and that 2:3b-8 cc is the hand of the editor. The editor is apparent because of the repetition of the phrases: "Then you will know that I am Yahweh," and "they will know that there has been a prophet in the midst of them." These are so similar to each other and so monotonously repetitious as to be characteristic of what is felt about the editor by Professor May.

From the viewpoint of psychological consistency there does not seem to be any reason why the suspected passage could not be by the hand of Ezekiel. In fact this particular passage demonstrates Ezekiel's fears of his fellow Israelites which is one of the twin pillars of his conflict. It is only upon the assumption of that kind of fear that the bizarre behavior which follows is intelligible (3:15, 24-27). The conclusion in terms of the present interpretation of Ezekiel would be in favor of authentic authorship of the passage.

Again, May feels that all passages indicating individual responsibility are editorial, thus 3:16-21 is the editor's hand. His grounds for this assumption appear to be mostly literary, that is because there is a smooth continuity in the script if in this case at least, the offending passage is taken out. He also feels that the main sections on individual responsiblity (cc. 18 & 33) are drawn with such legalistic completeness that they could only be the hand of a post-exilic editor and not Ezekiel in the midst of the exile. However without the strong emphasis on individual responsibility Ezekiel as a person is unintelligible. This is not merely because the present thesis would be invalidated. It concerns historical consistency as well as the psychological. The only hope the exiles had for doing anything about their situation was to cease blaming their forebearers for their ignominy and to realize that they were responsible for their own fate and to act accordingly. Without a message of personal responsibility Ezekiel merely shouted at his people with nothing

to say at all that Jeremiah had not said better. This is possible but it takes Ezekiel's prophetic role outside the realm of divine providence for it gives him no special word from Yahweh for the exiles in their situation. Ezekiel's message of personal responsibility on the other hand gives them a meaningful way to repent.

In terms furthermore of psychological consistency this watchman passage belongs intrinsically to the sequence of events because it seems to signal the renewed call to Ezekiel out of his stupor. May feels that Ezekiel's subsequent behavior is contradictory (3: 22-27) for it has him go into the plain (vs. 22), then into his house (vs. 24). It is contradictory however only if rational behavior is demanded. In Ezekiel's distressful state however rational behavior is about the last thing that ought to be demanded of Ezekiel.

Numerous critics (Holscher, Herntrich, Hermann, Matthew, Cooke, Pfeiffer and May) regard the symbolic actions of chapters four and five as editorial additions. This is probably due to the incredible difficulty they pose on account of their bizarrity. However psychological analysis shows them to be a part of Ezekiel's crisis in responsibility, and in terms of behavior of a catatonic nature quite consistent. Reference has already been made to the striking coincidence in dates: the opening vision is the fourth month, the fifth day, and the fifth year; add to this 390 days and forty days; then there are more visions at the sixth month, the fifth day, and the sixth year. This would seem to lend credence to the reality of the symbolic actions perhaps precisely as stated.

Various solutions, as already noted, are presented to explain the strange events of chapters eight to eleven. Reasons have already been given for holding that these events relate to a fantasy experience or even a dream by Ezekiel. May however feels that the oracle of restoration that concludes the vision (11:14-21) is a later addition presupposing the Diaspora. However the present study seems to show that perhaps the vision of hope is precisely what Ezekiel needed and it resulted in his finally assuming the prophetic role. It seems more than coincidental that Ezekiel, hitherto so tormented, returns to reality and to his fellow exiles and preaches for the first time (11:25).

Since the doctrine of individual responsibility is dealt with in chapter fourteen May suspects the editor's hand; and other critics are of mixed opinion on the authorship of this chapter. Once again from the viewpoint of the present study it appears to negate the major significance of Ezekiel to rule out personal responsibility as coming from his hand. Here Ezekiel strikes at the very heart of the notion of corporate responsibility upon which Israel probably often relied when he says: "....even if these three men Noah, Daniel and Job were in it, they would deliver <u>but their own lives by their righteousness</u> says Yahweh God." (14:14) (Italics are mine.) Thus whatever else the hand in this chapter may have edited it would seem that Ezekiel is responsible for such a passage as this.

As has already been noted May holds that the doctrine of individual responsibility found in chapter eighteen is not

Ezekiel's but the editor's hand. He holds that the rabbinical intricacy with which the doctrine is worked out indicates a later hand that is inconsistent with the urgency and relative spontaneity of a prophetic utterance. This writer holds that the key to the understanding of Ezekiel hangs on his under-standing of individual responsibility and is convinced further-more that the almost intricate development of the doctrine at this point (ch. 18) indicates how strongly held and thoroughly conceived the matter had developed in Ezekiel's mind. Moreover it must be remembered that Ezekiel does appear to be a peculiar combination of pedant and prophet, unless one prefers to remove one side totally from him by attributing all care for detail to an editor; then sections such as this one can safely be attributed to him.

In chapter twenty-four it is the present writer who faces a problem. Ezekiel is freed from his dumbness upon hearing of the fall of Jerusalem (24: 26-27). This would mean that Ezekiel has been mute for over four years. It means therefore that he did not prophesy as he is reported doing beginning with his return from the vision of Jerusalem (11:25). May suggests that the passage freeing Ezekiel of his dumbness is editorial and follows the editor's dogmatic view of the significance of the prophet's dumbness; i.e. it was built around the fall of Jerusalem. At this point a decision must be made. Either way a basic interpretation is upheld at the expense of another. Either Ezekiel was silent for four years

when he is reported preaching or he prophesied beginning with the vision of Jerusalem (cc. 8-11), or like all the prophets he was a preacher from his call. Because the evidence from cc. 8-11 is consistent not only with a bigger part of the book than the former view, and because it is consistent with an overall coherent explanation of Ezekiel's behavior this writer chooses May's interpretation that the prolonged dumbness is the dogmatic expression of an editorial viewpoint.

When we come to the section dealing with the restoration of Israel May feels a priori that there can be little from the hand of Ezekiel. Since, too, there is a passage on individual responsibility beginning this section (33: 1-20) this too, says May, cannot be anyone but the editor. Within the considerations of the present study both the doctrine of individual responsibility and hope of restoration are intrinsic to Ezekiel's ministry. Therefore it is not seen justifiable on those grounds alone to dismiss such sections as not coming from Ezekiel's hand. Another mention of Ezekiel's release from dumbness occurs in this chapter (33: 21-22); for reasons previously given it would appear that May is correct in attributing this to the editor's assumptions.

The followin chapter seems to be an application of the doctrine of individual responsibility to the leaders of Israel. May and other scholars attribute most of this section to post-exilic editing. This may well be so, but it would have to be because the references were obviously post -exilic and not merely on an a priori assumption that all

restoration and individual responsibility passages are ipso facto editorial.

May's almost dogmatic predilection to attribute all restorative sections to the editor falters most badly in the treatment of the vision of the valley of dry bones. Surely if the editor is as pedestrian as May and others seem to think he is he would be hard pressed outside the exilic situation to conceive of a vision as gripping as this one. In its conception it seems undoubtedly Ezekiel's.

In the vision of the restored community (cc. 40-48) Ezekiel comes to the fulfillment and climax of his ministry. Twenty years earlier he had a vision of the departure of the Glory of Yahweh from the temple (10: 1-22; 11: 22-23). Now he is granted the vision of its certain return. It is a fitting climax to a ministry begun in such torment but obeyed with courage. Lindblom sees in this final section a literary vision; that is, one that is consciously conceived. He may well be correct. It does seem likely however that the spur to such a vision would have been an actual experience, namely a vision of a return of the Glory of Yahweh and of the restored temple. However the intricate details and measurements were probably the fruit of Ezekiel's conscious planning, undoubtedly a last labor of love for this priestly person. The final image of the sacred river could well have been a final authentic vision of fulfilment granted to Ezekiel, a judgment by God upon his person and his work.

In the picture of Ezekiel that emerges from May's treatment of Ezekiel in the Interpreter's Bible we are given a rather shadowy person without much distinctiveness. In fact almost everything hitherto thought distinctive of Ezekiel becomes the work of disciple-editors. Gone is individual responsibility, any hope of restoration, and even Ezekiel's overriding emphasis on the glory of Yahweh: "that they might know that I am Yahweh." All that appears to remain of Ezekiel is a man who began his ministry with a strange vision of Yahweh and who thereupon preached a message of unrelieved doom, which suddenly was climaxed in a vision of the rebuilt purified temple in Jerusalem. This does not appear to present a coherent or meaningful picture of Ezekiel. Moreover May's grounds for removing so much of what seems intrinsic to Ezekiel's prophecies seem highly unsatisfactory based on a priori assumptions. All that Ezekiel is granted are his visions because he is a visionary.

It would seem that the present study makes a new contribution to the study of Ezekiel. It gives a coherent and psychologically consistent picture of the man thereby enabling a new dimension to enter into the critical study of Ezekiel. This does not mean that the psychological picture that emerges from the present study imposes itself on other conclusions. It merely adds another dimension to be considered an important factor before deciding on the unity of the text. The psychological integrity of the subject of the book thus becomes a feature of the Sitz im Leben. Just as the post-exilic

period shows itself through in many areas, so the person of Ezekiel comes through to confirm his authorship, or else to repudiate it. Whether such studies can be performed on other Old Testament prophecies is a question that can only be answered when they are examined with that in mind, from a point of view that takes them seriously as persons in relationship with ultimate reality, Being or God.

APPENDIX B

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ANCIENT ISRAEL

As a means of demonstrating that the problems of individual responsibility are the key to an understanding of the behavior of the prophet Ezekiel, and not a later reading -back into Ezekiel as May (29) asserts, it may be helpful to trace the growth in the understanding of individual respons -ibility through the history of Israel. This will be done in order to show that it is precisely in the exile that personal responsibility not only became a necessity of survival as has previously been stressed, but that the concept, implicit throughout Israel's history had reached the blossoming point at the time that it had become so vital.

The people of Israel had their beginnings as semi -nomads. A major characteristic of the nomadic life is freedom of movement. Freedom of movement in fact is so vital to that way of life that it is assumed to be the primary attribute of the Deity. Also characteristic of the life of the desert nomad is simplicity. It is the lack of simplicity in the settled society, born of dependence on the change of seasons and the conflicting forces of nature that tends to facilitate and foster polytheistic religion. A monistic understanding of the cosmos, centering itself on God as one and therefore as unique reflects back on the society. If God is one then relationship with him becomes possible and desirable, for such a God is related to his creation by his creative act. In a pantheon on the other hand the gods have

themselves to relate to and creation tends to become merely a reflection or battleground of the gods' relationships with one another. The gods are indifferent to creation as such. Where relationship can be had with the one God, and the I-Thou understanding develops the individual becomes a reality who is responsibile to God. That is to say a relationship of God and man becomes one of command and obedience, ergo, one of responsibility. The early development of this understanding is seen in the idealized Patriarchs of Israel. God commanded and they obeyed, especially in the life of Abraham. Later this came to be the core of Moses' leadership of the Israelites -Moses obeyed God's commands. The tribal form of society which the desert life took also was dependent on the strong personal leadership of the patriarch of the tribe, and within each tent the father. The dominant religious personality of the desert life came to be the lone seer. Hereditary leadership or institutional leadership was not always relied upon to guide the tribe or amphictyony. This is illustrated in the story of Gideon who rose to leadership charismatically (Judges 6:14) and who refused the office of hereditory Kingship (Judges 8:22,23). Throughout Israel's early history of crisis leadership was looked for in the charismatic individual who rose to the occasion. Thus out of Israel's desert past a strong emphasis was born of individual leadership, initiative and responsibility to God.

Opposing this inclination however is the simultaneous presence of the corporate understanding. This understanding

which thinks of the family, tribe, and nation as one personality is symptomatic of the totalistic thinking of all primitive thought. It is also born of the individual's total dependence on the larger unit, apart from which he could not survive for a moment. This would be especially true in the desert, where separation from the larger unit was synonymous with death. Thus in pre-exilic Israel the individual did not have a relationship with God of any significance because of his lack of significance, the seer and the charismatic leader excepted. Yahweh was the God of Israel not of the individual, and covenant was with Israel not with individuals. This fact is illustrated by the strange absence of belief in the after -life characteristic of Israel until well into post-exilic times.

In the corporate understanding the tribe or nation is identified by the name of its founder. Blood was for ancient Israel the bond of continuity, relationship and influence. Thus retribution followed to the third and fourth generation (Ex. 20:5). Cursed blood also polluted the entire community. Thus Achan who kept booty from the ruins of Jericho for himself had to be executed before all Israel was infected with his guilt. (Josh. 7) After the revolt led by Korah, Dathan, and Abiram (Num. 16: 20ff.), they, their family and even their possessions had to be destroyed lest they curse all Israel. The strength of the corporate curse persisted right down to the exile and it was the fatalistic impotence that this feeling engendered against which Ezekiel battled so forcefully (cf. expecially Ez. 18 and 33). Worthy individuals

could also bring blessing to their family, tribe or nation. Ezekiel also fought the persistence of this ideal.(Ez. 14:14) Protests were made throughout Israel's history long before Ezekiel against the unfairness of corporate retribution. Abimelech protested against it even as he illustrated it (Gen. 20:4). Moses himself protested against Yahweh's threat to the whole community for the rebellion of Korah, Dathan and Abiram (Num. 16:23). Thus Israel was of two minds about corporate responsibility for much of its settled history. Corporate understanding in the Deutero-Isaianic literature and especially Christian understanding seems to have overcome the enervation implicit in corporate responsibility by stressing the importance of personal repentance as a condition of participation in corporate benefits.

The influence of the settled Canaanite culture amongst which Israel settled had a further debilitating effect upon the development of individual responsibility. The democratic nature of the desert community gave way to the stratification and exploitation of the complex agricultural society. It was however precisely that exploitation which ran so counter to the old ideals that led to the return of the individual prophets. In Canaanite society prophesy was a group ecstatic phenomenon which like everything else in the agricultural community served the interests of the status quo. Well-being in Canaanite society depended on the predictability of the seasons leading to rich produce from the soil. No thing and no individual could be allowed to do or say unusual things

that might offend the gods and the established order or else the gods might punish by depriving the land of the needed rains. The lone seers of Israel were no longer welcomed and were soon absorbed into the ecstatic prophetic bands of Canaan. Here each prophet was under the implicit control and influence of the group. But when some farmers were not fortunate and others were and the latter took over the lands of the former stratification developed in Israel. A class of wealthy landowners dominated the poor tenant farmers. The old equalitarian ideal of the desert was lost, and the ethical nature of the Covenant law was flouted. The prophets of old began to rise up protesting against Israel's apostasy from Yahweh and the social exploitation that followed from going in the ways and the worship of Canaan and its gods. The prophets who arose, Elijah, Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah did not speak to individuals they spoke to Israel, and they did not speak of individual responsibility but of the Covenant. However their stress on repentance, return to Yahweh and the Covenant, on ethical behavior, had to depend on individual resolve, strength of character, obedience and ethical responsibility.

The very fact that prophets arose in the first place testified to the reality of the importance of the individual in the Israelite ideal. It was not yet every individual who was deemed uniquely responsible at this stage, only those upon whom fell the Spirit of Yahweh. However the

mere return of the person who saw the violation of Yahweh's commandments for Israel and dared to stand out testified to the important role that the individual had to play if he was to take the will of Yahweh seriously. Exactly when the idea of the Saving Remnant arose is not entirely clear. Some authorities say not until post-exilic times, but it appears implicit in the seven thousand who remained true to Yahweh in the excesses of Baal worship at the time of Elijah (1 Kings 19:18). To exhort Israelites to remain true to Yahweh in the midst of the apostasy around them was to appeal to a sense of individual responsibility. Thus the influence of the seventh and sixth century prophets would appear to have been in the direction of the implicit development of a sense of personal responsibility.

The Deuteronomic reform aimed to be a return for all Israel to Yahweh by means of a thorough reform of worship and a removal of its perversions. However by removing all sanctuaries from the countryside and replacing them with a central sanctuary in Jerusalem and by returning to the stress on corporate retribution the Deuteronomic reform was probably in some ways a step backward for the growth of the sense of individual responsibility. On the other hand its great stress on social justice and family responsibilities for teaching the younger generations would probably have tended to increase individual and social piety, as would the fact that the Decalogue uses second person singular pronouns. However Jeremiah saw that the Deuteronomic reform tended to further a sense of

complacence in the kingdom of Judah. External compliance and legalistic kowtowing to correct worship procedures were thought to be sufficient. The death of Josiah in battle in 609 and Judah's defeat engendered a profound reaction in the community. A sense of fatalistic drift combined paradoxically with what can only be described as masochistic defiance seems to have prevailed in the land.

Jeremiah came into this situation. So stern were his warnings to his fellow-citizens that he aroused their wrath as perhaps no other prophet had. He sought to recall them from their suicidal race to defeat and destruction. Because of his repudiation by his people he suffered a loneliness which he could scarcely bear. His only solace was found in his relationship with Yahweh and here he formed a profoundly personal relationship such as no prophet appears ever to have had. In his loneliness he was also thrust into himself and he came to express himself as a person more possibly than any other human being ever had until then (8:18 ff, 10:19, 15:10, 20:7 ff). Like all the prophets he spoke to Israel, but the sins he denounced were individual sins, faults of human character and motive which were at the root of Israel's peculiar combination of blandness and incredible stubbornness in the face of disaster. Jeremiah was, as Skinner (39) notes, deeply concerned for truthfulness between man and toward God. Having seen the failure of external compliance to Yahweh he sought the answer to true Covenant

relationship to Yahweh as a matter of personal righteousness of the individual heart (Jer. 31: 31-34). Change of heart and not change in the location of worship lay at the heart of true worship. "It was," says Skinner, "the great perplexity of his work to know that sin is rooted in the individual soul, and yet as a prophet to have no message except to the nation." (29, p. 153)

Up until the time of Ezekiel therefore the potential role of the individual was implicit in everything that was true to the Israelite tradition. The desert ideal stressed freedom and equality before Yahweh, and the tradition of leadership was to follow charismatic personal guidance. Social responsibility had been deemed intrinsic, in Israel's faith from the beginning and now the prophets spelled it out with unequivocal finality, putting it even ahead of the cultus as the measure of obedience to Yahweh. Even the corporate understanding had enabled the hope of a Saving Remnant who were faithful through all tribulation to be the means of Israel's renewal and redemption. But there had not yet developed an explicit declaration of the responsibility of the individual in Israel.

Ezekiel however was peculiarly in a position to call his fellow Israelites to their own responsibility for their fate, for his own call to prophesy was one that called him to his responsibility against his own preference, as we have seen. So sharp is the call to him that the fate of Israel becomes his responsibility. If he preaches he will not be

punished if Israel fails to listen but if he does not preach then its fate is upon him. He is the watchman over Israel (Ez. 3: 17-21). Obviously Ezekiel is already a man with an unusual understanding of the meaning of personal responsibility due possibly, among other reasons, as has been already suggested to the influence of Jeremiah. Thus he calls Israel with ruthless single-mindedness to the responsibilities of themselves for their own fate (Ez. 18 & 33). They have resigned themselves in their exile to fatalistic defeatism. "Our fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are set on edge." There is nothing that they could do since they were being punished for their father's sins.

Ezekiel flies to the opposite extreme, holding to a logically untenable position in which he denies all social consequences of sin (except his own failure to preach). However he is apparently the right man for the job. Israel as has been suggested seems to be shaken out of her lethargy. In exile they have no external comforts. Without the assurances of the cultus and its rituals of sacrifice to rely upon they must depend on moral strength and their sense of personal responsibility to Yahweh. Thus Ezekiel's message seems to have brought into the open what was implicit in Israel's faith but never fully realized or acknowledged.

This therefore concludes the study of Ezekiel in terms of a crisis in responsibility. In the last two chapters the attempt has been made to show first of all the clarification

that such an understanding lends to the unity of the book of Ezekiel, and secondly that Ezekiel brought out the sense of individual responsibility which had always been implicit in Israel's history to rescue her in this time of defeat and despair in her history. He seems to have been the instrument used to pull Israel from her Slough of Despond because in the personal crisis that he faced he rose from his.

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